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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
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ARTICLES
A GENERAL THEORY OF
EMINENT DOMAIN
William B. Stoebuck*
Where to begin? That is the question whenever one traces the
origin and development of any particular set of ideas. There is, of
course, some famous, if very light, judicial precedent that one should,
"Begin at the beginning, and go on till you come to the end: then
stop."' "The beginning," alas, is a point unattainable by those of us
who are neither speculative philosophers nor inspired prophets. Nor,
perhaps, do ancient beginnings matter much in our present inquiry,
except as a matter of curiosity.
Some claim the first recorded exercise of eminent domain power
was King Ahab's seizure of Naboth's vineyard.2 The internal facts,
however, indicate the king had no such legal'power, for he had to
have Naboth stoned to death before he could make the vineyard his.
In any event, there is no evidence that this Biblical incident contributed in the slightest to the American law of eminent domain, not even
in Massachusetts Bay Colony in its most God fearing days.
One is curious, next, about Roman expropriation practice. We know
about as much of this as we do of Naboth's vineyard. The principle
of expropriation was never formulated by legislator or jurist. It is not
even clear Rome exercised a power of compulsory taking, though some
scattered bits of evidence suggest she did. The straight roads and aque* Professor of Law, University of Washington. B.A., 1951, Wichita State University;
M.A., 1953, Indiana University; J.D., 1959, University of Washington.
1. The King of Hearts to the White Rabbit during the trial of the Knave of Hearts
for stealing the queen's tarts. L. CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND, Ch.
12(1901).
2. 1 P. NicHoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN 44 (rev. 3d ed. 1964); 1 Kings 21.
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ducts suggest this, and there was on occasion appropriation of materials for aqueduct repair upon compensation. 3 Whether compensation
was a regular practice is unknown. The one thing that is clear enough
about Roman expropriation law is that its mysteries cannot have had
discernible effect on our own practice.
Expropriation and compensation were both practiced in England
during the entire American colonial period. However, as far as is
known, no Englishman or American prior to the Revolution worked
out a systematic speculative theory of eminent domain. John Locke
4
gave a philosophical disquisition upon one aspect of the subject,
which was somewhat embellished by Blackstone. 5 The English to this
day have not raised the subject of eminent domain to the imperative
level at which it now exists in America. They do not even use the
phrase "eminent domain," but instead, "compulsory acquisition,"
"compulsory powers," or "expropriation." Compensation may be said
to be a constitutional principle, to the extent such can exist without a
constitution. Modern English treatises on expropriation scarcely go
back of the Lands Clauses Act of 1845, which was the first permanent, general statute on the subject.6 Before that, the power to take
and the duty to pay compensation were spelled out in each act that
directed the particular project for which the taking would occur. The
Lands Clauses Act has been largely replaced through the years by
other acts of more or less general applicability. 7 In England the whole
subject of what we call eminent domain is still a highly practical affair, attended by few of the abstractions with which we surround it.
We have come to regard eminent domain as a branch of constitutional law. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution and
the constitution of every state except North Carolina contain so-called
eminent domain clauses. The now classic language of the fifth amend-

3.
4.

Jones, Expropriation in Roman Law, 45 L.Q. REV. 512 (1929).
J. LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING CIVIL GOVERNMENT 378-80 (P. Laslett ed. 1960).

5.

1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 139.

6.

See C. CRIPPS, COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND 9-27 (1lth ed. 1962); T.

INGRAM, COMPENSATION TO LAND AND HOUSE OWNERS 1-3 (1864); D. LAWRENCE.
COMPULSORY PURCHASE AND COMPENSATION 75-84 (4th ed. 1967); W. LEACH. DISTURBANCE AND COMPULSORY PURCHASE 1-9 (2d ed. 1965); R. STEWART-BROWN. GUIDE TO
COMPULSORY PURCHASE AND COMPENSATION 1-5 (5th ed. 1962). None of these treatises
attempts to build up a history or general theory of taking or compensation, quite in

contrast to many American works. The English authors treat the subject in an intensely
practical way; they are concerned mostly with procedures.

7.
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ment reads: "nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation." Twenty-six state constitutions allow
compensation for property "damaged" as well as that "taken." 8 The
"damaging" language has the effect of more or less facilitating compensation for certain non-trespassory takings, though every act for
which compensation has been allowed as a damaging has, in some jurisdictions, also been compensated as a taking.
Because eminent domain has become a constitutional subject, it
may not be generally realized that its principles also exist in judgemade law. The early constitutional eminent domain clauses themselves were made pursuant to an existing ethos shared by judges along
with constitution makers. In other words, the principles we have
come to think of as constitutional existed and exist also independently
of written constitutions. There are some examples of this. Gardnerv.
Trustees of Village of Newburgh,9 probably the leading early decision, written by Chancellor Kent, required compensation on natural
principles at a time when there was no eminent domain clause in the
New York constitution. Indeed, many American decisions, mostly up
to about the Civil War era, explained eminent domain principles in
natural law terms. 10 Even today the state of North Carolina has no
eminent domain clause, but the state's supreme court has enunciafed
the principles and has been most liberal in applying them." The
United States Supreme Court has made compensation a requirement
8. "Damaged" or an equivalent word appears in the following state constitutions:
ALA. CONST. art. XII, § 235 (applies only to damagings by municipal and private
corporations and individuals); ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 18; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 17;
ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 22; CALIF. CONST. art. I, § 14; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15; GA.
CONST. art. I, § III,.para. I; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15; Ky. CONST. § 242 (applies only
to damagings by municipal and private corporations and individuals); LA. CONST. art.
I, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13; Miss. CONST. art. I, § 17; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 26;
MONT. CONST. art. III, § 14; NEB. CONST. art. 3, § 21; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 20;
N.D. CONST. art. I, § 14; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 24; PA. CONST. art. XVI, § 8 (applies
only to damagings by municipal and private corporations and individuals); S.D. CONST.
art. VI, § 13; TEXAS CONST. art. I, § 17; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 22; VA. CONST. § 58
(applies only to damagings by municipal and private corporations and individuals);
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16; W. VA. CONsT. art. III, § 9; and Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 33.
The model for these provisions is the amendment to the Illinois constitution, adopted
in 1870, intended to liberalize the allowance of compensation for loss of certain kinds
of property rights, particularly street access. See Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. 161
(1888), which reviews the history and purpose of the Illinois amendment.
9. 2Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. 1816).
10. Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6
Wis. L. REv. 67 (1931).
II. See especially Gray v. City of High Point, 203 N.C. 756, 166 S.E. 911 (1932);
Hines v. City of Rocky Mount, 162 N.C. 409, 78 S.E. 510 (1913).
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of due process, binding upon the states through the fourteenth amend12
ment.
In perspective, then, the constitutional eminent domain clauses are
not ends in themselves, nor are they beginnings. They are formal,
concise statements of principles recognized and enshrined, but not
invented, by the constitution maker. The real significance and
meaning of these principles, therefore, depends on the discovery of
their historical and theoretical development, rather than solely on the
interpretations of the constitutions. The purpose of this article is to
develop a framework, based on that discovery, for analyzing the principles of eminent domain. It will impose order upon our inquiry if we
organize it under the following heads: the act of taking, the compensation requirement, the public-purpose limitation, and the concept of
property.
I.

THE ACT OF TAKING

In its first aspect, what we call eminent domain involves the transfer, in a prescribed mode, of property interests from one to another.
Implicit in this is the notion of private property, which is necessary to
make any transfer possible.
It is difficult to conceive of any society, even one composed of only
two interacting persons, that does not recognize private property. If A
has any claim to the clothes on his back that B does not, then A has
private property. This and many similar rights must exist even in
so-called communistic societies, such as the Shakers or the Utopians.
Private property in land exists today in abundance in Russia. Everyone there has a special claim to his house or apartment, which, while
it may not correspond to our concept of fee ownership, is quite close
to the property interest we call leasehold. Private property exists in
any society we can imagine, the only differences being in its nature
and extent from one society to another. So, transfers are everywhere
possible.
There are, of course, various modes for transferring property rights,
differing somewhat from one legal system to another. The transfer
12. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The holdings in these cases were foreshadowed by a
deliberate, though unnecessary, statement to the same effect in Chicago B. & O.R.R.
v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233 (1897), and by weaker dictum in Holden v. Hardy,
169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898).
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involved in eminent domain has certain characteristics that distinguish
it from other forms of transfer. First, it occurs between an individual
and the state, or some alter ego of the state such as a public utility,
with the state or the alter ego always being the transferee. As a
consequence, it is accurate to think of the transferee-state as having
enough of the nature of an individual to receive the same property
right the transferor had. This is the basis for the statement that the
state is viewed as an individual treating with another individual for
13
an exchange.
A second, and the most distinguishing, characteristic of the eminent
domain transfer is that it may be compelled over the transferor's immediate, personal protest. The qualifying words "immediate" and
''personal" are not usually found in discussions of eminent domain,
but have been added here for a reason that will be spelled out in the
ensuing exploration of the power to take. In some sense a power is
involved, and it is a power belonging to the state. It is an act of the
state in its capacity as sovereign. This implies, first, that eminent
domain exists only in societies having sovereign governments, not, for
instance, in the hypothetical microscosmic society of A and B. Of
more practical importance, it implies that eminent domain transfers
may occur only when the body politic is involved and chooses to exercise its power.
For a more detailed examination of the power involved in eminent
domain, it will be convenient to consider the subject under two subheads. The first will deal with the origin and nature of the power to
take, and the second will distinguish this from other powers of government.
Origin and Nature of The Power to Take
One thin line of authority would have it that the power to retake
land is impliedly reserved when land is patented out by the state. A
''necessary exception in the title to all property," would be a typical
formulation.' 4 A more extreme statement would be that "the right of
eminent domain is a remnant of the ancient law of feudal tenure."' 5
A.

13. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139.
14. Donnaher v. State, 9 Miss. 242 (8 S. & M.) (1847). See also Cushman v.
Smith, 34 Me. 247, 259-60 (1852), in which the court seems to mean the same thing
in speaking of "title superior."
15. New York City Housing Auth. v. Muller, 155 Misc. 681, 279 N.Y.S. 299, 300

(1935).
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The consequences of any such reserved-power theory would be
most unsettling, even to courts that have referred to it. Presumably, no
compensation would be required, nor would it be necessary to go
through the elaborate judicial condemnation procedure. And government's power, being reserved in the original grant, seemingly would be
prior to all encumbrances, such as easements or liens, the holders of
which would not be entitled to compensation. None of these consequences occur in the decisions that dabble-for this is all they are
doing-with the reserved-power theory.
A most obvious rebuttal to this theory is that it simply is not in accord with actual practice. With one exception, to be recorded below,
there is no indication that any English or American government has in
fact reserved any such power. For a court to create a fictional power
would be to announce a rule of law, but that rule does not exist because it would produce consequences that, as just mentioned, do not
occur. Moreover, it would not be possible for one government, such
as an American state, to take land that had originally been granted by
another government, such as the United States government or the
British government. Nor would it be possible to condemn personalty,
the ownership of which does not trace back to a governmental grant.
The reserved-power theory, while it might be the basis for some imagined system of expropriation, does not explain our system.
There is one historical exception, in which a kind of reserved power
did exist. When William Penn received his royal grant to Pennsylvania, he sold land subscriptions to "adventurers and purchasers" in
England. His agreement with them was that, for lands they purchased
in the countryside, they were to receive proportional lands in "the"
city. In order that they could travel from country to city, Penn agreed
to lay out roads from other towns to the city and from town to town.' 6
But when the settlers reached Pennsylvania, "the" city, Philadelphia,
was the only established town, so that the location of roads could not
then be determined. So, in the original grants Penn granted six per
cent additional land as his contribution for roads. The understanding
was that the colonial government could thereafter take back without
compensation such land as proved necessary for roads when their lo-

16.

The agreement between Penn and the subscribers is contained in AcTs OF
THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA viii (Hall & Sellers printers 1775).

ASSEMBLY OF
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cation was known. It was anticipated that some owners might subsequently lose more or less than six percent for roads, but this was
agreed to as an inevitable consequence of the scheme. During the entire colonial period, therefore, and even into the federal period, Pennsylvania took land for roads without paying compensation. However,
under a colonial act of 1700, compensation was given for the improvements on land. 17 Colonial Pennsylvania, then, provides the only
known legitimate example of the reserved-power theory.
Our received wisdom on the subject of eminent domain is that it is
an inherent and necessary power of all governments. A classic exposition is by the Supreme Court in Kohl v. United States,' 8 in which the
federal government was held to have eminent domain power because
"such an authority is essential to its independent existence and perpetuity." This rationale certainly has the sanction of many judicial utterances.' 9 It is the standard explanation adopted by the leading Amer20
'ican commentators on eminent domain.
This inherent-power concept traces back to the early speculative
2
writers on eminent domain, the civil law jurisprudents Pufendorf, 1
Bynkershoek, 22 and Vattel. 23 Grotius, who is generally considered the
father of modern eminent domain law and the originator of the term
"eminent domain," speaks of the principle that "public advantage"

17. These matters are all reviewed in M'Clenachan v. Curwin, 3 Yeates (Pa.) 362
(1802), and Feree v. Meily, 3 Yeates (Pa.) 153 (1801). M'Clenachan held that, even

in 1802, compensation was not required for unimproved land.
18. 91 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1875). Strangely, it was not until this decision that the
federal government was clearly determined to have eminent domain power. Until

they used the federal power to obtain land for the post office involved in Kohl, federal

officials had apparently had state governments condemn land for federal purposes.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513 (1883); Bonaparte v. Camden
& A. R.R., 3 Fed. Cas. 821 (No. 1617) (D.N.J. 1830), Cairo & F.R.R. v. Turner, 31
Ark. 494 (1876); Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17 N.J.L.R. 129 (1839).
20. 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *339; 1 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT
DOMAIN 18-23 (rev. 3d ed. 1962); Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policyand
Concept, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 596 (1954).
21. S. PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM 1285 (C. and W. Oldfather

transl. 1934). This work was originally published in 1672.

22. C. VAN BYNKERSHOEK, QUAESTIONUM JURIS PUBLICI 218 (T. Frank transl. 1930).
This work was originally published in 1737.
23. E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 96 (C. Fenwick transl. 1916). This work
was originally published in 1758. On the cited page Vattel also says: "It is even to be

presumed that when a Nation takes possession of a country it only allows private
property rights over certain things subject to this reserve." Taken alone, this language
might seem to be the origin of the reserved-power theory discussed earlier. Perhaps

it is the origin; however, Vattel's main thrust is that eminent domain is a governmental,
not a proprietary, power.
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should prevail over "private advantage. 2 4 Bynkershoek, the most in25
cisive and complete of these early writers, stated their concept thus:
Now this eminent authority extends to the person and the goods of the
subjects, and all would readily acknowledge that if it were destroyed,
no state could survive .

. .

. That the sovereign has this authority no

man of sense questions ....
In one sense, it might be said that a particular government has such
authority if an agency with power to make a binding rule on the subject has so determined. The United States Government has the authority in that sense because the Supreme Court thus held in Kohl v.
United States. The American states have the authority for the same
reason. Neither the United States Constitution nor, as far as is known,
any state constitution contains an express grant of this authority. That
explains why the courts have spoken of an "inherent power." However, this language must be understood to have force no further than
the necessity of the case requires, that is to say, only to the particular
government of the court and not to governments in general.
As to governments in general, it is apparent that the inherent-power
concept rests on the assumed assertion that they absolutely must have
the power to appropriate. It is far from certain that eminent domain
power is "inherent" in the sense governments would perish if they did
not have it. Natural persons and corporate bodies conduct all sorts of
activities with great success without any such power. Take even so
imperative a government activity as waging war. Suppose land could
not be condemned for fortifications. This would make the conduct of
war more difficult than it now is, but the nation would not be defenseless. Land for fortifications could usually be acquired, though perhaps
not always exactly where desired and, no doubt, at a higher average
cost than if it could be expropriated. Perhaps we could even agree
with Pufendorf that eminent domain is "one of the lesser functions of
'26
supreme sovereignty.
It is probably true now that American governments have the power
to condemn any property rights to aid in accomplishing any permis-

24. H. GROTIus, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS 807 (F. Kelsey transl. 1925). This work
was originally published in 1625.
25. C. VAN BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 22, at 218.
26. S. PUFENDORF, .upra note 21, at 1285.
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sible governmental enterprise.2 7 This, of course, is by force of judicial
decisions declaring them to have the power to that extent. It is further
true that English, as well as American colonial, state, and federal,
governments have followed the practice of expropriating land for certain purposes for several centuries. Going back to about the beginning
of the sixteenth century, many, many English and colonial statutes
authorized condemnation of land and building materials, either for
specific projects or generally, for: roads, 28 bridges,2 9 fortifications, 30
27. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
28. Connecticut general highway act, undated, but enacted before 1715, contained in ACTS AND LAWS OF CONNECTICUT 50-51. (T. Green printer 1715), and in
ACTS AND LAWS OF HIS MAJESTY'S ENGLISH COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 85 (T. Green
printer 1750); Delaware general highway act of 1752, contained in LAWS OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF NEW-CASTLE, KENT AND SUSSEX UPON DELAWARE 334 (B. Franklin
& D. Hall printers 1752); Georgia general highway act of 6 March 1766, contained
in GEORGIA COLONIAL LAWS, 17th FEBRUARY 1755-10th MAY 1770 (I. McCloud ed.
1932); Massachusetts general highway act, Ch. 10, L. 1693, contained in ACTS AND
LAWS OF HIS MAJESTY'S PROVINCE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS-BAY 47 (B. Green
printer 1726); Massachusetts general highway act, Ch. 7, L. 1712, id. at 227; Massachusetts act regulating buildings and roads in Boston, Ch. 1, L. 1692, id. at 1; New
Hampshire general highway act of 1719, contained in ACTS AND LAWS PASSED BY THE
GENERAL COURT OR ASSEMBLY OF HIS MAJESTIES PROVINCE OF NEW-HAMPSHIRE 149
(B. Green printer 1726); North Carolina general highway act, Ch. 3, L. 1764, contained in ACTS OF ASSEMBLY OF THE PROVINCE OF NORTH-CAROLINA 310 (J. Davis
printer 1773); Virginia general highway act, Act 50, of 1732, contained in 1 HENING,
VIRGINIA STATUTES AT LARGE 199 (1823); Stat. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 6 (1662) (general
statute for enlarging and repairing highways); Stat. 8 & 9 Win. 3, c. 16 (1697)
(general statute for widening highways); Stat. 6 Ann., c. 42, §§ 6, 7 (1707) (act for enlarging and repairing highways around the city of Bath); Stat. 10 Ann., c. 16, §§ 4,
5, 6 (1711) (act for enlarging and repairing a road in county of Kent). The above is
not an exhaustive list of English statutes, but it is a complete listing of all colonial
statutes available to the writer in which expropriation was clearly authorized.
It is virtually certain that land was condemned for roads in the American colonies
not mentioned above and that it was condemned before the dates of the statutes cited.
A 1639 Massachusetts Bay act, the original of which is not available to the writer,
authorized the taking of land for highways, apparently by a procedure similar to that
of later Massachusetts statutes. See Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N.H. 19 (1840), and W.
LOYD, EARLY COURTS OF PENNSYLVANIA 246-47 (1910). In Maine, there are several
interesting records of early condemnation procedures in local trial courts, reported in
PROVINCE AND COURT RECORDS OF MAINE (C. Libby ed. 1931). The record is given of

such a case between Godfry Shelden and the Towne of Scarborough in the County
Court at York on 6 July 1669, and of an order by the same court, appointing a
committee to lay out a road, in which it appears land could be condemned upon
compensation. 2 id. at 177, 220. See also 4 id. at 95, 318 & 376-77.
In Maryland 1704 and 1724 statutes established procedures for laying out roads
and repairing bridges. COMPLEAT COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF MARYLAND 26, 264
(W. Parks printer 1727). The only specific mention of condemnation was for bridge
timbers, but it seems likely that land must have been taken also. New Jersey had
skimpy road statutes that simply required towns and counties to appoint surveyors
to lay out highways. Ch. 20, Acts of 1675, and ch. I, Acts of 1682, contained in
GRANTS, CONCESSIONS AND ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONS OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW-JERSEY
[AND] THE ACTS PASSED DURING THE PROPRIETARY GOVERNMENTS 102, 257-58 (A.
Leaming and J. Spicer eds.) (pub. shortly after 1750). This volume covers New Jersey
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river improvements, 31 and for the great fen drainage projects that
were carried out in seventeenth and eighteenth century England. 32
When we say, as we just have, that English and American "governments" have expropriated land for this purpose and that, we have not
been precise enough. We must make a distinction between the legislative and executive branches-between king and Parliament. This
leads first to an examination of that English historical institution, the
king's prerogatives, which were powers the crown exercised in its own
right, without the need of parliamentary authority.
Among the King's prerogative powers were dominion of the sea,
control over navigation, foreign affairs, defense of the realm, enforcing acts of Parliament, dispensing justice, coining money, providing for his own household, granting offices and titles of nobility, and
collecting taxes. 33 These ancient powers appear to have come down
from a time before parliamentary supremacy was established; indeed,

acts during the proprietary period. Later statutes, for the period 1702-1776, are in
ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW-JERSEY (S. Allinson ed.
1776). Pages 386-403 of this work contain a lengthy general highway statute of II
March 1774 that repeals all former road acts, but which says nothing on compulsory
taking or compensation. However, it appears that land was expropriated for roads in
New Jersey and compensation awarded as early as 1681. See Scudder v. Trenton
Delaware Falls Co., I N.J. Eq. 694, 708-09, 722-26 (1832).
29. For the American colonies, see the highway statutes cited in the preceding
note, most of which also dealt with bridges. Many English acts authorizing expropriation of land for bridges are listed in the indexes to the Statutes of the Realm and
Statutes at Large. See, e.g., Stat. 14 Geo. 2. c. 33, § 1 (1741) (general bridge act):
Stat. 12 Geo. 1,c. 36 (1725) (Thames bridge at Westminster); Stat. 1 Geo. 2. c. 18
(1728) (Westminster bridge); Stat. 9 Geo. 2, c. 29 (1736) (Westminster bridge); Stat.
12 Geo. 2, c. 33 (1739) (Westminster bridge); Stat. 13 Geo. 2, c. 16 (1740) (Westminster bridge): Stat. 23 Geo. 2, c. 37 (1750) (Thames bridge at Hampton Court).
30. See, e.g., Stat. 4 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1512) ("Bulwerkes Brayes Walles Diches and al
other fortificacions" from "Plymmouth"' to "Landes ende," Cornwall); Stat. 7 Ann. c.
26 (1708); Stat. 31 Geo. 2. c. 39 (1758); Stat. 32 Geo. 2. c. 30 (1759), Stat. 33 Geo.
2. c. 11 (1760).
31. See, e.g., Stat. 6 Hen. 8, c. 17 (1514-1515); Stat. 31 Hen. 8. c. 4 (1539): Stat.
7Jac. lc. 19(1609).
32. See, e.g., Stat. 15 Car. 2. c. 17 (1663) (Bedford Level): Stat. 16 & 17 Car. 2.
c. 11 (1664-1665) (Deeping Fen); Stat. 21 Geo. 2, c. 18 (1748) (Isle of Ely); Stat. 2
Geo. 3, c. 32 (1761) (Fens in Lincoln County). An earlier act, Stat. 43 Eliz., c. 11
(1601). calling for fen drainage in the Isle of Ely and in Cambridge, Huntingdon.
Northampton, Lincoln, Norfolk, Suffolk, Sussex, Essex. Kent, and Durham counties.
made land available for the project by an interesting technique that might be termed
"semi-expropriation." The fee owners, together with a majority of the holders
of
rights in common, were authorized to contract with persons for draining the soil.
This is the same technique that was later used in the enclosure acts. See, e.g.. Stat.
29 Geo. 2. c. 36 (1756), as amended by Stat. 31 Geo. 2,c. 41 (1758).
33. A more detailed and complete list is in 6 COMYN'S DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND. 28-76 (4th ed. 1800).
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they seem hardly capable of growth by, say, the sixteenth or seventeenth century. 34 Implied in the powers enumerated were further
powers "necessary and proper" (as American constitutiorial lawyers
would say) to accomplish the principal objects. Under some of these
further powers, the king or his ministers might make use of private
land and to some extent even destroy the substance of it, all without
compensation. For instance, the king might, it was finally decided in
1606, dig in private land for saltpeter to make gunpowder for defense
of the realm.3 5 Or he might, through his commissioners of sewers,
rebuild and repair ancient drains, ditches, and streams for draining
the land to the sea. 36 This came from his power to guard against the
sea and to regulate navigation. From the same power, he might build
and repair lighthouses, build dikes, and grant port franchises.3 7 To
carry out his prerogative to coin money, he had power to work all
gold and silver mines. 38 Fortifications could be built without compen39
sation on private land, these being, of course, for defense of the realm.
Also without compensating, the king's officers could raze private
buildings to protect his subjects against a conflagration. 40 While the
other prerogatives have been merged into our modem doctrine of
eminent domain, this power to raze remains yet, not precisely as an
exception to eminent domain theory, but as survivor of an older institution.
Most of the prerogative acts were done without compensation.
However, with purveyances of supplies for the royal household, when
they could be made without the owner's consent, the ancient and universal practice seems to have been to require payment of full value. Magna
Charta allowed the king to take corn and other provisions without
consent for immediate cash payment.4 1 When, in 1661, a statute allowed
the king to have compulsory use of horses, oxen, and carriages for his
travels, it was at a rate per mile set out in the statute. 42 Similarly, the
34. See Case of the King's Prerogative in Saltpetre, 12 Coke. 12, 77 Eng. Rep.
1294 (1606).
35. Id.
36. Case of the Isle of Ely, 10 Coke. 141, 77 Eng. Rep. 1139 (1610).
37. 5 Bacon's Abridgment Prerogative,498, 503-04, 510 (5th ed. 1798).

38.

Id. at 516.

39. See Case of the King's Prerogative in Saltpetre, 12 Coke. 12, 77 Eng. Rep.
1294 (1606).
40. Id.
41. Magna Charta, Ch. 28 (1215).
42. Stat. 13 Car. 2, c. 8 (1661).
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1662 statute that authorized compulsory land or water transportation
for the army and navy required payment, either at rates fixed in the
statute or by arbitration. 43 Other purveyance acts, which allowed acquisition of supplies only with the owner's consent, probably meant in
practice that the owner would often sell at a bargained-for price. Some
of the purveyance acts, then, did recognize the compensation principle that we associate with eminent domain. To this extent there may
be some borrowing historically between prerogative and eminent domain theory.
One thing the king could never do under his prerogative powers
was to take a possessory estate in land. We know he might have interests like profits and easements, but a distinction was apparently always
made between these interests and estates. Possibly a theoretical explanation would be that the king, as chief lord and grantor, could not
derogate from his own grant. By Magna Charta, Chapter 31, the king
and his officers are forbidden to take timber without consent. Commenting on this, Lord Coke makes the revealing observation that it
was thus because timber was "parcell of the inheritance," which the
king could take "no more then the inheritance it selfe." 44 In Case of
the Isle of Ely,4 5 Coke and the other justices held that sewer commissioners could not be given power by the king to take land for new
drainage works, though Parliament might have conferred such power.
Consistent with this is Blackstone's assertion that only the legislature
46
may condemn land.
Prerogative power and eminent domain, though similar in some
ways, were essentially different. Prerogative belonged to the king,
eminent domain, to the legislative branch. Prerogative could not be
used to acquire estates in land and only under heavy restrictions to
acquire personalty, while eminent domain power exists for those purposes. Compensation is always associated with eminent domain, but
with prerogative, only for certain kinds of purveyances and then by
force of statute. It seems true that some of the prerogative powers
have now been comprehended within eminent domain, to the extent
prerogative was used to acquire personalty or to diminish property

43.

Stat. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 20 (1662).

44.

E. COKE, SECOND INSTITUTE *34-35.

45.
46.

10 Coke. 141, 77 Eng. Rep. 1139 (1610).
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139.
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interests in land. A remnant from prerogative is the power to destroy
buildings without compensation to stop the spread of a conflagration.
Only in a limited sense, then, is it proper to think of eminent domain
and prerogative as being the same institution even today. It is not at
all.correct to say eminent domain grew out of prerogative.
Therefore, we cannot pinpoint the origins of eminent domain in
English law until we find two things: (1) an act of Parliament that (2)
authorized a compulsory taking of an estate in land. The first definite
evidence of expropriation of land and, therefore, of eminent domain,
is found in the earliest of the several statutes of sewers, enacted in
1427. 47 Reciting that ancient ditches, gutters, walls, bridges, and
causeways for draining lowlands in Lincoln County had fallen into
disrepair, the statute appointed commissioners of sewers to maintain
them, with power to assess benefitted landowners. Evidence of power
to take land is fleeting: "where shall need of new to make." There is
no indication of condemnation procedure, nor of a compensation requirement. Coke, however, says the taking of land for new works was
authorized under this act and under the several renewals of it.48 A
most interesting statute of 1512 definitely allowed land on the Cornish
coast to be taken, or at least occupied, for fortifications and, in express language, without compensation. 49 Why without compensation?
Obviously because the act was in aid of the king's prerogative to build
47.

Stat. 6 Hen. 6, c. 5 (1427). The earliest statute found that even remotely con-

tains elements of eminent domain was the Statute of Winchester of 1285, which required landowners to cut down underbrush along roads so that robbers might not

hide. Stat. Winchester, 13 Edw. 1, Stat. 2, c. 5 (1285). Obviously this was not an
exercise of eminent domain but of what we would call the police power, as were
some other statutes of the Middle Ages that required riparian owners to remove
such obstructions as "gorces, mills, wears, stanks, stakes and kiddies" from navigable
streams. Stat. of Cloths, 25 Edw. 3, Stat. 4, c. 4 (1350). See also Stat. I Hen. 5, c.
2 (1413); Stat. 4 Hen. 6, c. 5 (1425); Stat. 9 Hen. 6, c. 9 (1430). To their contem-

poraries, the Statute of Winchester and the navigable-stream acts would likely have
been understood as passed in aid of the king's prerogative powers.

Another practice that falls short of eminent domain is the old English system, also
very much a part of American history, of requiring landowners to contribute labor
and materials to the repair of roads. See, e.g., Stat. for Mending of Highways, 2 & 3
Phil. & M., c. 8 (1555); Stat. 5 Eliz., c. 13 (1562); Stat. 18 Eliz., c. 10 (1576); Stat.
29 Eliz., c. 5, § 2 (1587); Stat. 3 & 4 W. & M., c. 12, §§ 5, 6, 7 (1691); Stat. I Geo.

1, Stat. 2, c. 52 (1715); Stat. 7 Geo. 2, c. 9 (1734). For American colonial statutes,
see those cited in note 28, supra.
48. Case of the Isle of Ely, 10 Coke. 141, 77 Eng. Rep. 1139 (1610). The original

statute was for ten years. It was continued from time to time by Stat. 18 Hen. 6, c.
10 (1439); Stat. 23 Hen. 6, c. 8 (1444-45); Stat. 12 Edw. 4, c. 6 (1472); Stat. 4 Hen.
7, c. 1 (1488-89); and Stat. 6 Hen. 8, c. 10 (1514-15).

49.

Stat. 4 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1512).
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fortifications, as the statutes of sewers were in aid of his prerogative to
drain land into the sea. Perhaps it is significant also that it was
thought necessary explicitly to deny compensation, hinting that
someone in 1512 might otherwise have expected it. At all events, by
1514 and again in 1539 we have clear examples of eminent domain
with compensation in a form we would recognize today. The 1514
statute authorized the city of Canterbury to improve a river, but provided that anyone whose mill, bridge, or dam was removed should be
"resonably satysfyed." 50 In 1539 the statute granted power to the
mayor and baliffs of Exeter to clear the River Exe, providing that
"they shall pay to the owners and farmers of so much ground as they
shall dig, the rate of twenty years purchase, or so much as shall be
adjudged by the justices of assise in the county of Devon."5 ' It is interesting to note that the cities of Canterbury and Exeter were authorized
by Parliament to perform works the king might have done under his
prerogative powers. Not only does this indicate the king's power was
not exclusive, but it suggests that, while the king might have acted
without paying compensation, Parliament would not. After this period
of time, Parliament exercised its power of eminent domain regularly
52
and often, as we have already observed.
We have made progress. We have established that eminent domain
arose in Anglo-American jurisprudence as a function of Parliament.
The legislative function has been distinguished from the kingly prerogative power. And finally we have demonstrated how and when
eminent domain arose as a parliamentary institution. It is time to return to the basic problem of this section, which is to examine the nature of the power involved in the act of taking by eminent domain.
This we do by posing the question, why is eminent domain an exclusive function of the legislative branch?
The answer is tied in with the Anglo-American concept of representative government. John Locke gets to the heart of the matter in
53
his Essay on Civil Government:
Thirdly, The Supream Power cannot take from any Man any part of
his Property without his own consent. For the preservation of Prop50.
51.
52.
53.

Stat. 6 Hen. 8, c. 17(1514-1515).
Stat. 31 Hen. 8, c. 4(1539).
See notes 28-32, supra.
J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Civil Government, in LOCKE'S Two TREATISES

O01GOVERNMENT 378-80 (P. Laslett ed. 1960).

566

Eminent Domain
erty being the end of Government, and that for which Men enter into
Society, it necessarily supposes and requires, that the People should
have Property .... 'Tis true, Governments cannot be supported without
great Charge, and 'tis fit every one who enjoys his share of the Protection, should pay out of his Estate his proportion for the maintenance
of it. But still it must be with his own Consent, i.e. the Consent of the
Majority, giving it either by themselves, or their Representatives
chosen by them.
Of course Locke was speaking of taxation as well as of expropriation. He is uttering the classic cry, "no taxation without representation." But his statement was understood by the American colonists to
apply as well to eminent domain. Article 10 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, adopted in 1780 and the prototype for several
other original state constitutions, manifestly shows its Lockeian
54
source:
Each individual of the society has a right to be protected by it in the
enjoyment of his life, liberty and property, according to standing laws.
He is obliged, consequently, to contribute his share of the expense of
this protection; to give his personal service, or an equivalent, when
necessary: but no part of the property of any individual can, with justice, be taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his own
consent, or that of the representative body of the people ... and whenever the public exigencies require that the property of any individual
should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive reasonable
compensation therefor.
The final sentence, requiring compensation, will be dealt with in the
next section; it did not come from Locke and is quoted here only for
completeness. Interestingly, this final sentence was not in the drafting
committee's draft, but was added on the floor of the Massachusetts
constitutional convention. 55 So, the principle that first came to mind,
even before the compensation requirement, was that property could
be taken only by consent-of the individual in person or by his representatives consenting for him. Several other of the early state constitutions, adopted during or shortly after the Revolutionary War, con-

54. 3 F. THORPE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 1891 (1909).
55. See Journal of the Convention for Framing a Constitution of Government
for the State of Massachusetts Bay 38, 191-94, 225 (1832).
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tained equivalent language about consent. 56 In point of time, the constitutions of the thirteen original states as a rule contained the consent
language earlier than, in later constitutions, they did provisions for
57
compensation.
Now we may answer the question previously posed: why is eminent
domain an exclusive function of the legislative branch? The answer
contains the following elements: (1) The sovereign has no power to
expropriate property, including tax money, from an individual; (2) Of
course the individual may always consent to give away his property or
money to the sovereign or, for that matter, to anyone having capacity
to receive it; (3) The essence of representative government is that the
citizen delegates to his legislative representatives a power to speak and
act for him; and (4) By force of this delegated power, the body of legislators may consent in the citizen's behalf that his property or money
shall be given up. To be sure, some limitations have been engrafted
onto the exercise of this power; these will be discussed presently. But
the pure power is a power to consent, not to take against the will.
How realistic is this? It must be granted that the consent theory is
not the traditional inherent-power doctrine. And of course it can exist
only in a political society, such as ours, that has evolved a mature
concept of representative government. How far it is thought to exist in
56. DEL. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1792); N.H.CONST. part I, art. XII (1784); PA. CONST.,
Declaration of Rights, art. VIII (1776); VA. CONST., Bill of Rights, § 6 (1776). See
F. THORPE, supra note 54.
57. The following original state constitutions contained nothing on the taking of
property: DEL. CONST. (1776); GA. CONST. (1777); N.H. CONST. (1776); N.J. CONST.
(1776); S.C. CONST. (1776). The following original constitutions contained language,
said to be a principle of Magna Charta, to the effect that men should not be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without the consent of their peers or the law of the land:
MD. Co sT., Declaration of Rights, art. XXI (1776); N.Y: CONST. art. XIII (1777);
N.C. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. XII (1776). New Hampshire's second constitution contained both the consent and judgment-of-peers formulas, but no compensation requirement. N.H. CONST. part I, art. XII and part 1, art. XV (1784).
South Carolina's second constitution contained only the judgment-of-peers statement. S.C. CONST. art. XLI (1778). Connecticut had no constitution until 1818; Maine,
none until 1819; and Rhode Island, none until 1842. See, respectively, 1 F. THORPE,
supra note 54, at 536 (1909); 3 id. at 1646; 6 id. at 3222.
A compensation requirement first appeared in Vermont's abortive constitution of
1777, which, after being framed by a convention and affirmed by the legislature, was
never ratified by the people. VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 1I (1777). This requirement was
included in the next Vermont constitution, which was ratified. VT. Co NsT. ch. I, art. II
(1786). Meantime, the original Massachusetts constitution was ratified with a compensation requirement. MASS. CONST. part I, art. X (1780). Next, Pennsylvania's second
constitution, of 1790, and Delaware's second constitution, of 1792, picked up this
requirement. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 10 (1790); DEL. CoNST. art. I, § 7 (1792). Other
states gradually added compensation language, generally during the 19th century.
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practice in such a society depends upon how much one believes in the
reality of legislative representation. An exception must exist for persons who have property subject to eminent domain and who for some
reason have no electoral voice in choosing representatives. Another
exception might at first blush seem necessary for a citizen of state A
who owns land in state B, but this is not really an exception, for, by
coming into state B he subjects himself to its laws as an alien.
If one accepts the principle of representative government, there is
no compulsory taking, but rather a voluntary relinquishment by delegated consent. A corollary is that there must be legislative authority
for every exercise of eminent domain. It will now be understood why,
in the beginning of this section, it was said that property could be
taken, not against the owner's absolute will, but only over his "immediate, personal protest."
B.

Eminent Domain Distinguishedfrom other Powers of
Government

There is a great deal of artificiality in attempting to pigeonhole the
types of sovereign power into police power, war power, navigation
power, taxing power, eminent domain power, and the like. For one
thing, one never knows what to do with such activities as schools,
roads, post offices, and water departments. These are swept into the
amorphous category of general welfare power, which sounds like a
filing system in which everything goes into the "miscellaneous" file.
Then there is the interfacial problem of, for example, where does taxation end and eminent domain begin? Furthermore, since the purpose
here is to distinguish.the eminent domain power, if we were to do that
by reference to other powers, we should have to define at least some
of them also. This suggests it would be better simply to identify those
phenomena which must coincide before we can say government has
engaged in an act of eminent domain.
First, eminent domain must be pursuant to parliamentary authority.
Second, Parliament's power was to acquire for the use of government
private property, originally an estate in land. The private owner gives
up, and government acquires, a property interest. A more detailed
examination of "property" as it exists in eminent domain will be made
later. For the moment the term may be taken to mean a private property interest that can be identified as such within the private owner's

569

Washington Law Review

Vol. 47: 553, 1972

totality of interests and capable of being transferred by him. Eminent
domain involves a transfer, or its equivalent, of such an interest to the
government.
In the usual case, in which the government acquires the fee in land
there is no difficulty in seeing the transfer at work. This is more difficult in some unusual situations, but will still be found to occur upon
precise analysis. For example, in United States v. Welch58 the Government took A's land, across which neighbor B had an easement appurtenant. The Government's use of A's land prevented B from using his
easement. In effect, the easement had been extinguished; that is, the
easement rights were transferred from the dominant tenement and
merged back into the servient tenement from which they had originally come, just as B might have released his easement to A. Similarly,
in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,5 9 where a corporation having eminent
domain power flooded land, in effect they acquired a well known interest in land, a flowage easement. Again, where a governmental entity
blocks the street access enjoyed by an abutting owner, in substance
government has received the release of the interest known as an easement of access that formerly burdened the street. In all these examples
government's quantum of property rights have been augmented and
the condemnee's rights diminished.
This description of the act of taking forces some line drawing between eminent domain and two other categories of government
powers. First is the so-called police or regulatory power. The distinction here ought to be whether government has acquired unto itself a
property right-an interest that is literally or effectively transferred
and increases government's store of proprietary interests. The police
or regulatory power passes no such interest to the government. It may
(and here is where confusion begins) decrease some private owners'
property interests and may, in equal measure, increase other private
owners' interests. For instance, a zoning regulation that prevents you
from building over thirty-five feet high may impose upon you something very like an easement of light, air, and view, burdening your
land and benefitting your neighbor's.6 0 It is not done, however, under
58. 217 U.S. 333 (1910).
59. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166(1871).
60. Incidentally, however much we protest that government may not compel one
private owner to transfer property interests to another private person, by this and
many similar regulatory measures we really do so. We say that we are "adjusting
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the eminent domain power, because, assuming a transfer of some sort
does occur, it is not to the government in its ownership capacity.
None of this precludes the possibility that a governmental act in the
superficial form of police power might actually be an exercise of eminent domain instead of, or in addition to, police power. For instance,
an ordinance forbidding landowners to enter an abutting street would,
presumably, be both a regulatory traffic measure and an extinguishment (forced release) of the owners' easements of access upon the city's
street. Clearly also, nothing said above implies that all police power
measures are constitutional, but only that they are not objectionable
as uncompensated exercises of eminent domain. A zoning ordinance,
while it should not be struck down as a taking, certainly may be invalid on other grounds, such as that it denies due process or is a denial
of equal protection of law.
The second category of similar government power is that of taxation. It is not merely similar to eminent domain; it is the same, as far
as the power itself goes. Locke treated eminent domain and taxation
interchangeably, as we have seen, requiring a legislative act to exercise either power. 61 Why not say that a taking of money is the same as
a taking of property? Indeed, is not money property, as the United
States Supreme Court held in 1969?62
Traditionally, writers on eminent domain have been scrupulous to
find distinctions between that power and taxation. Possibly they have
been overmuch concerned with preserving neat and logical distinctions between the labels. More likely the concern has been that labeling taxation as eminent domain would inevitably require compensation exactly equal to the amount of tax. That supposed impasse,
however, flows from an imperfect understanding of the compensation
requirement, to be discussed as the next item in this article. Anticipating that discussion, it can be said that a tax exaction would have to
be returned under eminent domain theory only to the extent it exceeded the taxpayer's fair share of the cost of his government. The
corollary also is true, that the government would not have to compensate for the taking of property interests in land or chattels if
conflicts" among citizens, and we hope we are, but we are in many exercises of the
police power also compelling a certain amount of transfer or redistribution of
property rights.
61. See note 53 and accompanying text, supra.
62. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
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the levy fell fairly on a particular owner along with the general
citizenry. What would be the difference between, say, a money tax
at the rate of $1,000 per section of land and an in-kind exaction
at the rate of one acre per section? The distinction between what
we call taxation and what is called eminent domain lies, not in any
differences between money and things, but between even and uneven
exaction. With both taxation and eminent domain, the same basic
power is being exercised; it is merely exercised in different ways.
II.

THE COMPENSATION REQUIREMENT

Any sampling of eminent domain cases would certainly show that
"compensation" is the issue in the vast majority, either the question
whether it should be given or how much. From this point of view, the
compensation requirement must be said to be central. But from what
has previously been said here about the nature of the legislative power
to expropriate, compensation would appear less fundamental. If the
power to take is, in our representative system of government, really a
power delegated to one's representatives to consent to a transfer of
property rights, it could be argued that the legislature could consent
on whatever terms it chose. Since the owner might make a gift, the
legislature might also transfer gratis or for any price. Though this
seems correct in theory, we must hasten to acknowledge that any such
possibility is foreclosed in America by constitutional requirements for
just compensation. What we see operating here is, therefore, a limitation or additional requirement superimposed upon the pure concept of
eminent domain.
We have previously seen that American courts have come to regard
compensation as a fundamental principle even in the absence of an
express constitutional requirement. This is the situation in North Carolina today, and the United States Supreme Court has read a compensation requirement into the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 63 As American courts were forging their eminent
domain doctrine in the early to middle, and even into the latter,
part of the nineteenth century, they commonly ascribed the requirement to the following sources: Natural law; Grotius and several other

63.
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civil law jurisprudents; and English precedent, including Magna
Charta and the common law. In some instances, as in the renowned
64
1816 case of Gardner v. Trustees of Village of Newburgh, compensation had to be founded in general principles, there being no
constitutional requirement. Judges sometimes also spoke of more
exotic sources, such as the Bible, Roman law, and the universal
practice of all civilized peoples, which we cannot examine for lack
of data. However, the three sources first listed can be examined.
J. A. C. Grant has shown convincingly that between, roughly, 1800
and the Civil War, American courts supported the compensation requirement on natural law grounds many times.6 5 He is supported by
ample numbers of decisions. 66 Chancellor Kent, who also wrote the
Gardner opinion, insured currency to the natural law rationale by
explaining in his Commentaries that compensation "is founded in
natural equity, and is laid down by jurists as an acknowledged principle of universal law."' 67 Though it is interesting to know the courts
found a natural law basis for compensation, that fact is more the beginning than the end of our present concern.
In the first place, it is no surprise to find early nineteenth century
American courts explaining eminent domain compensation in natural
law terms. What legal doctrine did they not thus explain? Natural law
was the prevailing judicial philosophy. Moreover, the term in itself is
almost meaningless; it is an empty vessel into which one can pour

6.4. 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. 1816).
65. Grant, The "'HigherLaw" Background of the Law of Emineni Domain, 6
Wis. L. REV. 67, 71-81 (1931).

66. In the following cases the state constitutions did not expressly require compensation at the time, so that the courts can be said to have required it upon natural
principles: Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 28 F. Cas. 1012 (No. 16,857) (D. Pa. 1795); Young
v. McKenzie, 3 Ga. 31, 44 (1847); Proprietors of Piscataqua Bridge v. New-Hampshire
Bridge, 7 N.H. 35 (1834); Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17 NJ.L. 129 (1839); Bradshaw v.
Rodgers, 20 Johns. 103 (N.Y. 1822); Gardner v. Trustees of Village of Newburgh, 2

Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. 1816). Vanhorne v. Dorrance is a real tour de force, containing,
not only the most extended and fundamental discussion of eminent domain principles
the writer has seen in any American decision, but also a clear statement of the
doctrine of judicial review that foreshadowed Marbury v. Madison. The following
cases contain less important statements of natural-law theory, sometimes in dictum:
Bonaparte v. Camden & A.R.R., 3 F. Cas. 821 (No. 1617) (D. NJ. 1830); Cairo &
F.R.R. v. Turner, 31 Ark. 494, 499 (1876); Loughbridge v. Harris, 42 Ga. 500, 503
(1871); Henry v. Dubuque & P. R.R., 10 Iowa 540, 543 (1860); Harness v. Chesapeake
& 0. Canal Co., 1 Md. Ch. 248, 251 (1848); Ash v. Cummings, 50 N.H. 591, 613
(1872); Bristol v. New-Chester, 3 N.H. 524, 534-35 (1826); People v. Platt, 17 Johns.
195, 215 (N.Y. 1819); McMasters v. Commonwealth, 3 Watts 292, 294 (Pa. 1834).
67. 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *339.
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almost anything. By "natural law," a judge may only be saying "I will
it so." To St. Thomas Aquinas, it meant "derived from God," a divine
law underlying all human law. To some it means immutable ethical or
philosophical principles. To others-and this seems to be what it
meant to nineteenth century judges-it means principles that perhaps
all civilized peoples, or perhaps the progenitors of Anglo-American
law, subscribed to in common. In this sense the theory of natural law
rests on nothing more than actual or ascribed notions shared by some
sort of consensus of the universe of people referred to; it does not
examine any question of rightness or wrongness more ultimate. It assumes that the collective will of this universe is sufficient foundation
for law. Blackstone, certainly a natural lawyer, said something very
similar when he said the common law is "general customs," of which
the judges are "the living oracles."' 68 Today we might render it, "The
judges are the spokesmen of community consensus."
We are all natural lawyers in the broad sense of the term and always shall be as long as we acknowledge any source of law outside the
law. Roscoe Pound's sociological jurisprudence is not so different
from Blackstone's jurisprudence of custom. Nor is any of this opposed
to the jurisprudence of realism. One can agree fully with Blackstone,
or even with St. Thomas, and still subscribe to Holmes' stark, "The
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law."' 69 Holmes is talking about municipal law, the law in force, while Blackstone and St. Thomas are
talking about the source of that law. Whether that source is God, custom, or what the judge had for breakfast, when we consider whatever
it is, we are natural lawyers. And when we consider the judicial
product of the process, we all are positivists. We are simply considering two different stages of the judicial process.
So, it is no great revelation to say early American courts ascribed
the compensation requirement to natural law. The more significant
question is to examine what "natural law"-what particular sourcethey had in mind. Other than vague references to the Bible, Rome,
and all civilized people, we can identify two sources, the civil law
writers and English common law, including Magna Charta. In other
words, the term "natural law" was used as shorthand for these two
and was not in itself a separate source.
68.
69.
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The usual source of legal doctrine for an early state court having no
indigenous controlling rule was an English decision. Not only by force
of the reception act we would expect to find in most states, but by the
simple necessity of the case, an American court claiming the common
lgw as its birthright had to turn to the English reports. And so, what
English cases were cited as authority for the compensation requirement? None. An oversight? No; there were none. As far as exhaustive
research shows, there was not a single English, nor, for that matter,
any reported American colonial, decision rendered prior to the formation of the Union in which it was held or said that compensation was
required for a taking. If, then, our state courts were correct in their
oft-repeated assertion that compensation was an English constitutional or common law right, that claim must be supported by historical matter other than reported decisions.
We have already seen that eminent domain is a legislative power,
exercised by Parliament and not by the king. The earliest clear instance of this_ power is found in the various statutes of sewers, the first
/f---wo
'wch was enacted in 1427.70 In a strict sense, one could say that
eminent domain compensation could not have arisen until that time.
However, the compensation principle can be traced further back in
connection with what we today would see as an analogous institution,
the king's prerogative to make purveyances. Chapter 28 of the 1215
Magna Charta reads, "No constable or other bailiff of ours shall take
corn or other provisions from anyone without immediately tendering
money therefor, unless he can have postponement thereof by permission of the seller." If, as commonly supposed, Magna Charta was a
reassurance of established principles, we might speculate that compensation for purveyances was then already an expected thing. Be that as
it may, it is no speculation that compensation became a feature of a
number of purveyance statutes through the American colonial period.
In many instances the prerogative was destroyed entirely by the statutory requirement that the owner freely consent to the transfer. 71 Other
statutes, following the Magna Charta formula, allowed compulsory
transfer but required compensation, either at a customary (market value) rate72 or at a rate fixed by the statute.73 One suspects that
70. See note 47 and accompanying text, supra.
71. See, e.g., Stat. Westminster I, 3 Edw. 1, c. 1 (1275); Stat. 14 Edw. 3, St. 1, c.
19(1340).
72. See, e.g., Stat. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 20 (1662).
73. See, e.g., Stat. 13 Car. 2, c. 8 (1661).
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even the statutes that outright forbade purveyances contemplated that
the king would ordinarily obtain supplies at a price freely bargained
74

for.

Purveyance statutes are in themselves examples of the principle that
government must pay for what it takes. It is tempting to infer that
medieval Englishmen conceived of this as a general politico-legal
principle. That may, however, not be permissible in the absence of
other direct evidence. We saw previously that the king's powers were
regarded more warily than parliamentary ones, which was why only
Parliament had eminent domain power. At a certain stage of history it
is not unusual to find what are later systematized as general principles
applied only to isolated cases. It may be a truism that, viewed chronologically, what begins as the exception ends up as the rule. Still, despite a lack of direct evidence, one may speculate upon some connection between the compensation requirement in eminent domain and a
similar earlier principle for purveyances. Possibly compensation was a
general principle or perhaps it was only a principle for purveyances
that was applied specially by analogy to eminent domain.
Just when compensation became an accepted principle of English
law is difficult to pinpoint. We can say, though, that it existed from
the beginning of the American colonial period, which is a significant
point for our purposes. The main problem is that, so far as research
shows, there was virtually no discussion of the question by English
writers. It is a subject about which they appear to have had remarkably little intellectual curiosity. There is Blackstone's remark that the
legislature, in taking a man's land, always gives him "a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained. '7 5 Of course
this dates from the end of the colonial period.
A more important discussion, dating happily from the beginning of
the period, is found in Robert Callis' Reading Upon the Statute of
Sewers,7 6 which was delivered in Gray's Inn in 1622. We may have
some faith in what he says, since only a learned barrister of that
inn would have been invited to give readings. In the part in question,
Callis was discussing whether the Statute of Sewers then in force empowered sewer commissioners to build new ditches and drains or
74. This suspicion is heightened by those statutes that said a purveyance could be
made only by consent and at an agreed price. See, e.g., Stat. 36 Edw. 3, St. 1,c. 6
(1362); Stat. 2 & 3 Edw. 6, c. 3 (1548).
75.

76.
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only to repair existing ones. The original statute, enacted in 1427
as 6 Henry 6, chapter 5, had given them this power, but it had
been replaced by a later act in the reign of Henry VIII that was
not clear on the point. 77 In fact, shortly before Callis gave his
78
reading, Lord Coke's court had held in the Case of the Isle of Ely
that the later statute conferred no such power. The Privy Council had
then nullified that decision by an opinion that new works were au79
thorized. Callis concurred with the Privy Council and then added:
That where any man's particular interest and inheritance is prejudiced
for the Commonwealths cause, by any such new erected works, That
that part of the Countrey be ordered to recompence the same which
have good thereby, according as is wisely and discreetly ordered by
two several Statutes, . . . 27 Eliz. Chap. 22 [1585] ... And the other
3 Jac. Reg. c. 14 [1605] ... [which] may serve as good Rules to di-

rect our Commissioners [of sewers] to imitate upon like occasion
happening.
Callis implies that compensation was a general principle, though
his proofs are neither ancient nor strong. The statute of 27 Elizabeth
is in point, since it authorized the city of Chichester to dig a canal and
required compensation. But the statute of 3 James was miscited; it
gave the commissioners of sewers control over certain tributaries of
the Thames and said nothing of takings or compensation. He might
have cited other better and slightly older statutes, as we will see. The
real significance of his statement is that he, as a fair representative of
his contemporaries, thought compensation required in principle in
1622.
Just how long before that time the principle was recognized is not
so sure. Since the 1427 original Statute of Sewers, mentioned above,
was the first clear exercise of eminent domain we have been able to
document,8 0 we cannot expect to find compensation earlier. The 1427
act, while it authorized the sewer commissioners to build new works,
said nothing about compensation or about procedures to acquire land.
It is not until the early sixteenth century that we find examples of a
statutory compensation provision.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Stat. 23 Hen. 8, c. 5 (1531).
10 Coke. 141,77 Eng. Rep. 1139 (1610).
R. CALLIS, supra note 76, at 104.
See note 47 and accompanying text, supra.
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One enticing theory, which might be made out, is that the requirement came to be accepted sometime around the turn of the century
after a period of doubt. We have previously mentioned the 1512 act
that ordered fortifications on the Cornish coast, land therefor to be
used expressly without compensation. 81 Then, two or three years
after, we find a statute authorizing the city of Canterbury to improve a
river channel, requiring compensation for destruction of mills and
dams. 8 2 Later sixteenth century statutes similarly required cities or
counties to pay for land invaded in making river improvements Parliament authorized. 8 3 From these bits of evidence it might be supposed
that the compensation requirement emerged as an accepted principle
around the time of the 1512 statute. However, the matter is clouded
by the fact that that statute was for constructing fortifications. The
king had a prerogative power to erect fortifications on private land
without compensation, on the theory he had a kind of servitude for
the purpose.8 4 Our statute may well have been viewed by its enactors
as being in aid of the king's power. So, for that matter, might the
Statute of Sewers have been viewed, in a somewhat different way, for
the king had prerogative power to, and did, appoint sewer commissioners. In fact, Coke believed the purpose of the 1427 Statute of
Sewers was to enlarge the powers of commissioners previously appointed by the king, to allow them to take the freehold for new works,
85
which, Coke said, only Parliament could authorize.
Thus viewed, an essential difference appears between the Cornwall
fortification statute and the later acts conferring power on cities and
counties. These political bodies were not exercising the king's power
but Parliament's power of eminent domain. Compensation, though
required in the latter case, might not be in the former, and the two
cases not be contrary. The Statute of Sewers was different yet, because, while it may have been intended to aid the king's commissioners, it gave them powers the king had not, powers of eminent domain.
If the compensation principle was recognized in 1427 as it was in the
next century, the commissioners would have had to pay for lands for
81. Stat. 4 Hen. 8, c. 1(1512).
82. Stat. 6 Hen. 8, c. 17(1514-1515).
83. See Stat. 31 Hen. 8, c. 4 (1539); Stat. 27 Eliz., c. 20 (1585); Stat. 27 Eliz., c.
22 (1585). See also Stat. 7 Jac. I, c. 19 (1609).
84. See Case of the King's Prerogative in Saltpetre, 12 Coke. 12, 77 Eng. Rep.
1294 (1606); 6 COMYNS'S DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 28-52 (4th ed. 1800).

85.
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new works. What the historical facts were, we do not know. We can
safely conclude only that eminent domain compensation was required
by Parliament as early as 1514-1515, that it may have been required
earlier, but that there is not sufficient evidence on the latter point.
Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries compensation
became a regular feature of English parliamentary acts. We have already cited at length many, many such statutes concerning roads,
bridges, fortifications, river improvements, and the draining of the
fens. 86 No statute of that era has been found denying compensation
for a taking. Until the Lands Clauses Act of 1845, each statute provided for its own compensation scheme, if any; so, one would have to
examine every act of Parliament to make an absolutely definitive
statement. However, so many statutes dealing with public works have
been sampled, a large percentage of those indexed in the Statutes of
the Realm and the Statutes at Large, that it is conservative to say Parliament extended compensation as the usual practice during the American colonial era.
In the colonies themselves the granting of compensation was well
established and extensively practiced at and before the time of the
Revolution. This history has- been largely lost to current scholars, who
apparently have not looked for it in the right place. 87 The virtual lack
of printed colonial appellate decisions denies that usual source for
practical purposes. A few post-colonial opinions.sketch in their states'
colonial eminent domain practices, and these will be mentioned. But
the richest source is the highway statutes adopted by colonial legislatures. These, together with a few other records, give a rather definite
picture of compensation practices for roads, no doubt the main cause
for the taking of land.
Compensation for road lands reportedly was given in Massachusetts Bay under a 1639 law and in New Amsterdam as early as the
1650's, though little detail is available on these practices. 8 8 We do,
however, get an intimate glimpse of compensation at work on the
local level from the record of an order entered by the Suffolk County
86. See notes 28-32, supra.
87. See, e.g., I P. NicioLs, EMINENT DOMAIN 53-58 (Rev. 3d ed. 1964); Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
88. The Massachusetts Bay act, I Laws of Mass. Bay Colony 64 (1639). 1 P.
NIcHoLs, supra note 87, at 54, and W. LOYD, EARLY COURTS OF PENNSYLVANIA 246-47
(1910). Loyd also describes the New Amsterdam system at 245-46. The sources
relied on are not available to the writer.
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(Boston) Court on 27 January 1673/1674.89 Some landowners in
Milton were awarded sums for land taken for a new road, "because
[the Law] doth alow Satsfaction [sic] for Land in Such Cases if the
parties Requier it." Even more revealing are several entries from
the same era for the County Court at York, Maine, which was, of
course, then a part of Massachusetts politically. The earliest, for 6
July 1669, shows that commissioners were appointed to lay out a road
across Godfrey Shelden's land and to fix the compensation to be paid
him by the town of Scarborough." As to others whose lands were
occupied, the court added, "those whose grounds are Trespased upon
are to be satisfyed according to Law." Another order, in 1671, appointing a committee to lay out a road directed that "where any
person suffers Inconvenience relateing to his propriety by the Convenience of the Road, It is to bee valewd & fully made good by the
Townes within whose limitts it falls, to all reasonable satisfaction." 9 '
Later, briefer minute entries of 1697/1698, 1705, and 1710 are consistent with the two earlier ones.92 The suggestion is of a well-defined
principle, understood at the working level and going back to the
mid-seventeenth century or earlier in Massachusetts.
Then we have highway acts for most of the colonies and can fill in
the gaps for some others with cases from statehood days. In the colonies, somewhat differently than in England at the time, the custom
was to adopt a general act for the building and repair of highways.
The Massachusetts statute of 1693, itself seemingly derived from the
1639 act, followed a scheme that later appeared in several other colonies. 93 Anyone, such as a town, that wanted a new road applied to the
county court, which appointed a commission to report on the need.
Upon the commissioners' report, if the court found the road needed, a
local "jury" was appointed to lay out the route. Compensation was
provided for as follows: "Provided, That if any Person be thereby
damaged in his Propriety or Improved Grounds, the Town shall make
him reasonable Satisfaction, by the Estimation of those that Laid out

89.

31

COLONIAL

SOCIETY

OF

MASSACHUSETTS,

SUFFOLK COUNTY COURT 167 1-1680) 400-01 (1933).
90. 2 PROVINCE AND COURT RECORDS OF MAINE

91.
92.

93.
OF I HE
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2 id. at 220.
4id. at95;4 id. at318;4 id. at376-77.
Mass. L. 1693, Ch. 10, found in ACTS AND LAWS, OF HIS MAJESTY'S PROVINCE
MASSACIIUSETTS-BAY IN NEW-ENGLAND 47-49 (B. Green printer 1726).
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the same ... ." An owner aggrieved by the "jury's" estimate could
appeal to the county court. Once a road was built, it was maintained
by the citizens of the towns through which it ran, who, under the
direction of town "surveyors," had to donate labor and materials. This
basic scheme of highway establishment and maintenance, with some
variation in details, was eventually followed by statute in Connecticut,
Delaware, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and partially in Pennsyl94
vania.
Data for the other colonies is more checkered, but everything there
is evidences compensation for road lands. The Georgia Supreme Court
in 1851 reviewed the matter and said compensation had been

awarded for enclosed, though not for unenclosed, land in colonial
times.9 5 Maryland's statutes seem not to have touched upon the subject, but a 1724 act permitted the cutting of timber for bridges as long

as it was not suitable for "Clapboards or Coopers Timber." 96 In New
Jersey apparently land for local roads was taken without compensation, on the theory the owners' benefits exceeded losses, while main
94.

Conn. act, undated but before 1715, found in AcTS AND LAWS OF His

MAJESTY'S ENGLISH COLONY OF CONNECTICUT IN NEW ENGLAND IN AMERICA 85-88 (T.

Green printer 1750), and in substantially same language in ACTS AND LAWS OF His
MAJESTY'S COLONY OF CONNECTICUT IN NEW ENGLAND 51 (T. Green printer 1715); Dela.

act of 1752, found in LAWS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NEW-CASTLE, KENT AND SUSSEX
UPON DELAWARE 334-41 (B. Franklin & D. Hall printers 1752); N.H. act of 1719,

found in ACTS AND LAWS PASSED BY THE GENERAL COURT OR ASSEMBLY OF HIS
MAJESTIES PROVINCE OF NEW-HAMPSHIRE IN NEW-ENGLAND 149-51 (B. Green printer
1726); N.C. L. of 1764, ch. 3, found in ACTS OF ASSEMBLY OF THE PROVINCE OF

NORTH-CAROLINA 310-13 (J. Davis printer 1773); Pa. L. of 1700, ch. 55, found in

ACTS OF ASSEMBLY OF THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA 9 (Hall & Sellers printers

1775). As to Pennsylvania, the word "partially" in text refers to the fact that road
lands could be taken without compensation because, in its original grants, the proprietary government added an extra six percent of land for future road use. See

notes 16-17 and accompanying text, supra. Therefore, the 1700 statute allowed compensation only for improvements on the land but not for land itself. See M'Clenachan
v. Curwin, 3 Yeates 362 (Pa. 1802), and Feree v. Meily, 3 Yeates 153 (Pa. 1801). As
a matter of general interest, the Pennsylvania statute book cited above, belonging to
the law library at the University of Washington, bears on the title page the handwritten name of its original owner, John Dickinson. Another example of his signature
will be found subscribed to the United States Constitution.
95. Parham v. Justices, 9 Ga. 341 (1851). The holding is that, while compensation
had not previously been required for unenclosed land, it henceforth would be, owing
to the increase in its value. Apparently there was no colonial statute on the question,
though the writer is unwilling to state this categorically. The only collection of
Georgia colonial statutes available, GEORGIA COLONIAL LAWS 1755-1770, 324-34 (I.
McCloud ed. 1932), contained a general road act of 1766 that did not deal with
compensation.
96. T. BACON, LAWS OF MARYLAND AT LARGE C. 14 § 3 (1765); COMPLEAT COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF MARYLAND (W. Parks printer 1727). The 1724 bridge act is on
page 264 of the latter collection.
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highways were paid for, at least after 1765. 97 The compensation situation in Virginia is not very clear, despite the preservation in Hening's
Statutes at Large of a number of road acts from 1632 onY8 There was
no general compensation scheme by statute, though bridge timbers
and earth fill had to be paid for from around mid-eighteenth century. 99
Apparently the practice was to take unimproved land for roads without compensation. 100 South Carolina's practices, though not statutory,
were well known, even notorious. Compensation was given in the few
instances in which improved lands were taken, but not for unimproved
land.' 0 ' The South Carolina Supreme Court sanctioned this sytem until
about 1836,102 raising both the eyebrows ofjudges in other states,103 and
04
the hackles of South Carolina's own dissenting judges.1
One feature of colonial compensation wants explaining. Apparently
the normal, if not universal, pattern was to pay only for improved or
enclosed land. 105 Even in Massachusetts and colonies that had her
comparatively thorough statutory scheme, that seems to have been the
case. It will be recalled that the Massachusetts statute spoke of satis97. Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., I N.J. Eq. 694, 756 (1832). The
court refers to a 1765 statute that allowed compensation for land for main highways,
which were thought to benefit all the public and not only adjacent owners. Since the
only statutory collection available to the writer was published in 1750, this could not
be confirmed. A 1682 road act required counties to build and maintain roads, but
gave no details on procedures to be used. N.J. L. of 1682, c. 1, found in GRANTS,
CONCESSIONS

AND ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONS OF THE

PROVINCE OF NEW-JERSEY

[AND]

THE ACTS PASSED DURING THE PROPRIETARY GOVERNMENTS 257-58 (A. Leaming & J.

Spicer eds., pub. shortly after 1750).
98. Some of the road statutes dealt with specific roads only or had to do with repairs. Repairs were made on the usual Anglo-American plan for the day, i.e., work
by citizens under the direction of local surveyors. Va. L. 1657-1658, Act 9, in I
Hening's Stats. 436 (1823); Va. L. 1705, Ch. 39, in 3 Hening's Stats. 392 (1812); Va.
L. 1748, Ch. 28, in 6 Hening's Stats. 64-69 (1819). The most interesting statutes having
to do with establishing roads were: Va. L. 1632, Act 50, in I Hening's Stats. 199
(1823); Va. L. 1705, Ch. 39, supra;andVa. L. 1748, Ch. 28, supra.
99. Va. L. 1738, Ch. 7, in 5 Hening's Stats. 31-35 (1819); Va. L. 1748, Ch. 28,
in 6 Hening's Stats. 64-69 (1819); Va. L. 1762, Ch. 12, in 7 Hening's Stats. 579 (1820).
100. See Stokes v. Upper Appomatox Co., 3 Leigh 318, 337-38 (Va. 1831)
(Brooke, J.).
101. Lindsay v. Commissioners, 2 Bay 38 (S.C. 1796). See also State v. Dawson.
3 Hill 100 (S.C. 1836); Shoolbred v. Corporation of City of Charleston, 2 Bay 63
(S.C. 1796).
102. State v. Dawson, 3 Hill 100 (S.C. 1836); Shoolbred v. Corporation of City of
Charleston, 2 Bay 63 (S.C. 1796); Lindsay v. Commissioners, 2 Bay 38 (S.C. 1796).
103. See Parham v. Justices, 9 Ga. 341, 348 (1851); Bloodgood v. Mohawk &
H.R.R., 28 N.Y. Comm. L. (18 Wend.) 9 (1837).
104. See especially State v. Dawson, 3 Hill 100 (S.C. 1836) (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
105. Except in Pennsylvania, where, owing to the unusual nature of the proprietary grants, payment was made only for the improvements situated on improved
land, but not for the soil itself. See note 94, supra.
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faction for "Propriety or Improved Grounds." This is not a denial of
the compensation principle, or was not so regarded at the time, however we might view it in our day. In a time when unimproved land
was generally of little worth, a new road would give more value than
it took. The principle is the still-familiar one of offsetting benefits and
was so recognized by judges who commented upon it in early state
decisions. 106 In effect, the colonials made an "irrebutable presumption"; that is, a rule of law by the fictionalizing process, that a new
road would always give more value than the unenclosed land it occupied had. One may feel this a violent assumption, even for land on a
wild frontier. Such an objection, however, goes, not to the principle,
but only to the facts on which it should be applied. The colonial practice of paying only for unenclosed land did not deny the general right
of compensation.
We have now seen that compensation was the regular practice in
England and America, as far as we can tell, during the whole colonial
period. One must stop short of saying it was invariably practiced, because data to support that kind of statement will never be assembled.
However, Blackstone, writing near the end of the colonial experience,
and Callis, commenting at the beginning, both regard compensation
as an accepted principle. Had there been more contemporary commentators, we might know more surely how they regarded the institution. The indications, though they lack that final degree of conclusiveness, all point to one conclusion: early state courts were justified in
their claim that compensation was a principle of the common law--of
immemorable usage in our land and in the land of our land.
The English and colonial usage, while it was precedent for the
compensation principle, did not touch upon one important dimension
of the subject. What is the theoretical justification for compensation?
What, in the relationship between citizen and state, requires payment
for property interests taken? For the answers to these questions, we
have to look initially to the third source of the compensation requirement cited by early American decisions, a group of continental writers
on jurisprudence.
The first of these writers in point of time, Hugo Grotius, was little
interested in the compensation issue. About all he said was that com106. See especially Parham v. Justices, 9 Ga. 341 (1851); Scudder v. Trenton
Delaware Falls Co., I N.J. Eq. 694 (1832); Lindsay v. Commissioners, 2 Bay 38
(S.C. 1796) (arguments of counsel against motion).
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pensation was required. 107 Samuel Pufendorf, writing a bit later in
1672, does briefly offer a rationale:1 08
Natural equity is observed, if, when some contribution must be made
to preserve a common thing by such as participate in its benefits, each
of them contributes only his own share, and no one bears a greater
burden than another .... IT] he supreme sovereignty will be able to
seize that thing for the necessities of the state, on condition, however,
that whatever exceeds the just share of its owners must be refunded
them by other citizens.
Emerich de Vattel agrees that "the burdens of the State should be
borne equally by all, or in just proportion."' 0 9 The fourth scholar
usually associated with the group, Cornelius Van Bynkershoek, seems
to be in general agreement. 110
The theory here is that of just share-that a citizen should be expected to bear no greater cost of government than other citizens. Why
is that so? Pufendorf bases the theory on "natural equity," which is
shorthand for, "I refuse to seek a more fundamental reason, but rest
my case in the belief I have reached a proposition you will accept
without demonstration." May we not still ask what would be so bad
about government exacting property of greater value from one citizen
than from his fellows? This question is really two. The first part asks
whether there is a general principle that government should treat subjects equally, as enshrined in the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Assuming
there ought to be a general principle of equal treatment, the second
question arises: Should this assumed principle be extended to property
interests?
The answer begins with John Locke, despite the fact that he did not
directly discuss the compensation question. At an earlier point in this
article Locke was quoted supporting the proposition that a taking had
to be consented to by the owner's legislative representatives. 1" Only
reluctantly did Locke concede that government should have the power
to compel the surrender of tax money or property. However, he recog107.
H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACiS 385, 807 (F. Kelsey transl. 1925).
108.
S. PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM 1285 (C. and W. Oldfather
transls. 1934).
109. E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 96 (C. Fenwick transl. 1916).
110. C. VAN BYNKERSHOEK, QUAESTIONUM JURIS PUBLICI 218-23 (T. Frank transl.

1930).
11l.
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nized there was no other way for government to be supported, and so
he acknowledged " 'tis fit every one who enjoys his share of the Protection, should pay out of his Estate his proportion for the maintenance of it." The word "proportion" is a reference to Pufendorfs principle of just share. Locke, however, carries the matter back to a more
fundamental proposition. He says the "preservation of Property" is
"the end of Government, and that for which Men enter into Society."
It would, of course, be absurd to form a government having "the" end
of preserving property, and then to use that government to take away
property.
In essence, Lockeian social contract theory says this: When men
were in a simple state of nature, before government was formed, they
enjoyed private property and personal liberty unhindered. As natural
society became more complex, its members impinged upon each
other, so that it became necessary to form governments, the purpose
of which were to preserve the private rights enjoyed in the state of
nature. Government is a servant, necessary but evil, to which its subjects have surrendered only what they must, and that grudgingly.
They recognize that government needs their money and other property to operate, but it would defeat the very purpose if government
could extract a larger share from a subject than it needs to serve its
purposes to him. Applied to taxation, this means no man should be
asked to give more than pays for his share of protection. Eminent
domain presents a special problem, for by its nature it falls unevenly
upon first this man then that. Compensation evens the score.
Lockeianism certainly is not the only theory of government, not
even among philosophers who in general subscribe to the social contract. Hobbes and Rousseau, both subscribers, describe the contract in
a way that would obviate the necessity, if not the possibility, of compensation. Hobbes states flatly that, while subjects have property
rights against each other, they have none "such, as excludeth the
Right of the Soveraign." 11 2 In Rousseau's paternalistic state, everything belongs to the sovereign, which parcels property rights out to its
subjects as it judges their needs. 113
No claim is here made that Locke is right or wrong in any ultimate
112. T. HOBBEs, LEVIATHAN 235-36 (A. Waller ed. 1904).
113. Is this a harsh interpretation of Rousseau? Read Bk. 1, Ch. 9, of his SOCIAL
CONTRACT, found in J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 65-68 (Penguin Books, M.

Cranston transl. 1970).
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sense-only that his was the accepted theory of government in America when the American doctrine of eminent domain was being hammered out. The earliest eminent domain clauses, such as Massachusetts', were mostly paraphrased from chapter XI of his Essay on Civil
Government.1 14 Indeed, the very idea of a written, ratified constitution is an embodiment of the social contract.
Professor Joseph L. Sax denies that the purpose of the compensation requirement was protection of private property or, as he puts it,
"value maintenance."'1 15 Speaking especially of Grotius, Vattel, and
Pufendorf, he says their concern was not the fact of loss, but the
danger that subjects might be tyrannized by ill-considered, hasty, or
discriminatory takings. Political freedom, not proprietary protection,
is the interest at stake.
There are several problems with this theory. Most obvious, Professor Sax has stated a basis for the so-called public-use limitation instead of for the compensation requirement. Grotius, Vattel, and Pufendorf, as well as Bynkershoek, were very interested in the question
of the purposes for which eminent domain could be used. They agreed
the power could not be used arbitrarily but carried on a lively discussion about whether it had to be for "public advantage" (Grotius), 116
"public welfare" (Vattel), 1 7 "necessity of the state" (Pufendorf), 118 or
"public utility" (Bynkershoek).1 19 The passages upon which Professor
Sax relies relate to that discussion. His explanation also ignores the
influence of John Locke, nor does he acknowledge the extensive
Anglo-American experience with compensation during the colonial
period. The ultimate problem with his theory, however, is selfimplied. If fear of political oppression is the reason for compensa114. Compare J. LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING CIVIL GOVERNMENT 376-80 (P.
Laslett ed. 1960), with the following: MASS. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. X
(1780) found in 3 F. THORPE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 1891 (1909); DEL.
CONST. art. I, Sec. 8 (1792) found in I id. at 569; N.H. CONST., Part I, art. XII
(1784), found in 4 id. at 2455; PA. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. VIII (1776)
found in 5 id. at 3083; VA. CONST., Bill of Rights, Sec. 6 (1776), found in 7 id.
at 3813.
115. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 53-54 (1964).
116. H. GROTIUS, supra note 107, at 385.
117. E. DE VATTEL, supra note 109, at 96.
118. S. PUFENDORF, supra note 108, at 1285. Pufendorf explains he does not mean
absolute necessity but necessity as a matter of degree, as long as the requirement was
not too much relaxed.
119. C. VAN BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 110, at 218. Bynkershoek equates his
standard of "public utility" with Grotius's standard, which was given in text of the
present chapter as "public advantage." The difference may be only in translation.
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tion, by what means might that oppression be accomplished? By the
taking of property interests. "Oppression, ....
tyranny," and like words
simply describe a process or phenomenon by which objects the subject
dreads are visited upon him by his rulers. He dreads, and would avert,
the objects, not the empty process. In this case the dreaded object is
loss of property, so that we see Professor Sax is concerned with protection of private property after all.
We return, then, to the principle that compensation is designed to
even the score when a given person has been required to give up property rights beyond his just share of the cost of government. This presumably always happens when interests in realty or personalty are
transferred to the government for some specific project. What about
taxation? At an earlier point the position was taken that the power
involved in taxation is the same power as that involved in eminent
domain. Locke required a legislative act for both and applied the
principle of "just share" to both. 12 0 What are the implications for, say,
a graduated income tax? The first observation one might make is that
John Locke must not be resting so easily these days. Beyond that, if
the theory of "just share" is to be observed, one would have to justify
uneven tax rates by demonstrating that taxpayers paying higher rates
receive correspondingly higher levels of benefits from government.
This is the argument when it is said the high-bracket taxpayer is protected and benefitted more than the low-bracket citizen by such services as national defense, police forces, schools, "roads, and so forth.
The extent to which this is objectively so, or, conversely, is mere rationalization is, of course, one of the great public debates of our day.
Nevertheless, the argument is still carried on in the form of the
Lockeian principle of just share.
When, however, unequal tax rates are justified, as they often are,
on the theory that government ought to act as redistributor among different persons or groups in society, this is non-Lockeian. It is
Rousseauist. In Rousseau's view, a member of society is entitled to no
more than he needs for subsistence. He is trustee of his property for
the public, and the state's proper function is to redistribute, to the end
that "all have something and none of them has too much." 12 1 Were
120. See notes 53 and 61 and accompanying text, supra.
121. J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 65-68 (Penguin Books, M. Cranston
transl. 1970).
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this theory to be applied to eminent domain it would produce a system
of taking much different from what we actually follow. For instance,
one could justify taking land from an individual for less than full value
or even for no compensation if that person were found to possess an
unequal amount of material things. So far as is known, the redistributive principle has not been urged for eminent domain takings as
it sometimes is for taxation.
If we view eminent domain and taxation as two forms of the same
power, a certain inconsistency will be seen to exist at the theoretical
level. We still insist upon exact value replacement for property condemned but not always for taxes assessed. It may be that the future
will see the redistribution principle applied to eminent domain, though
there is no indication this actually is occurring. Until it should occur,
we must say that compensation exists to insure that no more of an individual's property rights will be taken from him than represents his
just share of the cost of government. That is the purpose and the function of the compensation requirement.
III.

THE PUBLIC-PURPOSE LIMITATION

A private person has the inherent privilege of doing anything he
has the natural capacity for, limited by regulations imposed for the
protection of others. An artificial person, such as a corporation or
government, may do only those acts given it by its human creators.
We are fond of saying our state governments are governments of "limited powers," meaning that they may do anything not expressly denied
them. This somewhat misplaces the emphasis. In the first place, the
state constitution has, subject to the amendment process, permanently
withheld certain acts from the government. Then there are an infinite
number of acts that might be constitutionally permissible but which
the state government, meaning in this instance the legislature, has
never chosen to do. Should some state officer attempt to carry out
some ultra vires act, we would stay him, branding his attempt as either
unconstitutional or unauthorized.
If we view eminent domain as one power among many powers of
government, it is clear that it might not be used to further some ultra
vires end. So, if the state constitution prohibits the legislature from
authorizing a lottery, eminent domain could not be used to acquire
land for a state gambling casino. Or, if no legislative body having the
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power to do so has authorized a road from point A to point B, land for
such a road may not be condemned. In such cases as these, then, it
seems inevitable, even truistic, to say there is a public-purpose limitation on the exercise of the eminent power.
The more difficult question is whether there is, or ought to be, some
more stringent limitation on the use of the power. We saw a few pages
ago that the original jurisprudential writers on eminent domain were
very interested in that question, perhaps more so than in any other
122
eminent domain aspect.
These writers, however they might disagree on the proper amount
of it, did seem to agree that eminent domain should to some extent be
more restricted than other governmental powers. For instance, Pufendoff and Bynkershoek, while they used different terminology, seem to
agree that land should not be condemned for a park for the public's
pleasure, though the state might in general have the power to operate
parks. The civil law jurisprudents' views, being quoted in judicial decisions, apparently influenced nineteenth century courts that devised
the so-called public-use doctrine. At least the courts found theoretical
justification for a result they wanted to reach.
In its purest, and mostly fabeled, form, the public-use doctrine
would allow property interests to be taken only if the subject matter in
which they exist, land or things, will be used by the public. Reputedly
the doctrine traces back to some language by Senator Tracy in New
York's 1837 case of Bloodgood v. Mohawk &.Hudson R.R. 123 At
issue in Bloodgood was, first, whether the legislature could delegate
eminent domain power to a railroad and, second, if so, whether the
railroad had to pay for condemned lands before entry or could pay
later as the state did. The court answered the first question "yes," for
everyone knows the public uses railroads; so, the public-use doctrine
did not bar the delegation. On the second issue, the court held that the
"just compensation" requirement was for advance payment, since
it would be unjust to permit a possibly insolvent railroad to occupy
122. See notes 116-119 and accompanying text, supra.
123. 28 N.Y. Comm. L. (18 Wend.) 9, 56-62 (1837); Comment, The Public Use
Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599, 600
(1949). The Yale comment is a principal source of the comments made in the text
about the public-use doctrine. One fault with the comment, which does not affect its
usefulness for present purposes, is that it assumes the courts took the pure form of
the public-use doctrine more seriously than they probably did. It is thus easy to
establish the "demise" of a thing that hardly ever existed.
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land before paying. Senator Tracy disagreed with the majority on the
first point, feeling that "public use" ought rightly to mean possession
by a government agency. He even grumbled about the established
practice of condemning land for highways, for he could not see, if
"public use" meant "public benefit," where the power could be limited. Where, indeed?
Whatever the rhetoric, the practical limitations imposed by the
public-use doctrine have been slight. It was most often unlimbered in
railroad or mill act cases. A few mill acts were struck down in the
nineteenth century as involving non-public uses of eminent domain, but
they were generally upheld.' 2 4 After all, mill acts had existed in some
125
of the colonies without much question being raised about them.
Perhaps the public-use doctrine still has enough vitality that someone
might argue it as an objection to an excess condemnation, but with
hardly an expectation of success. Certainly no one would be so gauche
as to argue that a public park did not serve a public purpose, at least
126
not since urban renewal has generally been held to be a "public use."'
127
It is the urban renewal cases and especially Berman v. Parker
that have made clear that "public use" cannot be argued in any literal
sense. Not only does Berman sanction the taking of land for renewal
and resale, but it speaks, not of public use, but public purpose and of
that most broadly. One wishes the Court had spelled out its views
more fully. However, the concept seems to be built up out of these
ideas: eminent domain is no more sacred or profane than other
powers of government, it may be used in combination with other
powers when this would serve a public purpose, and what is a public
purpose is up to the legislature and hardly ever up to the courts. The
Supreme Court's decision, while it does not constitutionally prevent
state courts from taking a more restricted view of "public use," is
normative for the federal courts and, no doubt, highly persuasive on
the others. Berman's concept of public purpose seems very close to the
minimum limitation on eminent domain that our system will allow in
128
strict theory.
124. Loughbridge v. Harris, 42 Ga. 500 (1871) (mill act held invalid): Comment,
.upra note 123, at 600-08.
125. 1 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 58-60 (rev. 3d ed. 1964).
126. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); New York City Housing
Auth. v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936); Comment, supra note 123,
at 607-14.
127. 348 U.S. 26(1954).
128. See text accompanying note 122, supra.
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One question nobody has much worried about is what the constitutional draftsmen intended concerning public purpose. This is a bit
remarkable, considering that the public-use doctrine supposedly came
from the phrase "private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation." Grammatically, of course, "public use"
is descriptive and not limiting. The phrase does not read "shall not
be taken except for public use and not without .just compensation."
Nobody seems to have worried about that either, strangely. Nor does
there now seem to be much readily available evidence about what, if
anything, the draftsmen thought about "public use."
The words "public use" first appeared constitutionally in 1776 in
Pennsylvania and Virginia. Pennsylvania's 1776 Declaration of Rights
said: "But no part of a man's property can be justly taken from him,
or applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that of his legal
representatives .... 129 No public-use limitation would, of course, be
implied with "taken from him" included in the disjunctive. Virginia's
1776 constitution, however, gives the same difficulty as the fifth
amendment's present language: "That ...all men.., cannot be taxed
or deprived of their property for public uses, without their own consent, or that of their representatives so elected.
...
130 Two other
early constitutions agreed essentially with Pennsylvania's phraseology,13 ' one with Virginia's. 13 2 The commonest language respecting
property rights was what may be called the Magna Charta or due
process formula, which typically said no freeman ought to be "deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the judgment of his
peers, or by the law of the land.' 33 For present purposes, we mercifully may steer clear of the difficult question whether this was intend129.

PA. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. VIII (1776), found in 5 F. THORPE,

FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3083 (1909).

130. VA. CONST., Bill of Rights, sec. 6 (1776), found in 7 F. THORPE, FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3813 (1909).
131. DEL. CONST. art. I, sec. 8 (1792), found in 1 F. THORPE, FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 569 (1909); N.H. CONST., part I, art. XII, (1784), found in 4 id. at
2455.
132. VT. CONST., Ch. I, art. 11 (1777), found in 6 id. at 3740. This constitution
was never ratified by the people, but the same eminent-domain clause appeared in the
ratified constitution of 1786, Ch. I, art. II, found in 6 id. at 3752.
133. DEL. CONST. art. I, sec. 7 (1792), found in 1 F. THORPE, FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 569 (1909); MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. XXI (1776), found
in 3 Id. at 1688; N.H. CONST., part I, art. XV (1784), found in 4 id. at 2455; N.Y.
CONST. art. XIII (1777), found in 5 id. at 2632; N.C. CONST., Declaration of Rights,
art. XII (1776), found in 5 id. at 2788; S.C. CONST. art. XLI (1778), found in 6 id.
at 3257.
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ed to cover eminent domain. 34 If it was, the words "deprived of' do
not suggest a public-use or public-purpose limitation. Without some
extensive, and unavailable, legislative histories, the internal evidence
is not sufficient to establish that the drafters consciously intended such
limitation.
In a couple of instances, however, there is slight evidence of some
imperfectly defined desire to limit the taking power. The eminent
domain clause of Vermont's 1777 constitution, which was never ratified by the people, and of the 1786 constitution, which was ratified,
contains this phrase: "That private property ought to be subservient to
public uses, when necessity requires it ...."135 The problem, naturally, is what "necessity" means. The word may have been borrowed
from the civil law writers, with some thought of limiting the power.
Then there is the Massachusetts 1780 constitution, the adoption of
which has been documented. Article X of the Declaration of Rights
mentions "public uses" twice. 136 The second sentence reads: "But no
part of the property of any individual can, with justice, be taken from
him, or applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that of the
representative body of the people." So far, this is like the Pennsylvania
wording. Then the final sentence adds: "And whenever the public exigencies require that the property of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation
therefor." Now, the entire compensation clause, indeed the entire bill
of rights, was added after a proposed 1778 constitution was soundly
rejected by the towns when it was submitted to them for ratification.
In a number of instances towns gave the lack of a bill of rights as a
reason for rejection, though we cannot cite anyone who complained
specifically about lack of an eminent domain clause.13 7 So, when the
134. Of course the Supreme Court now has adopted the principle that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment guarantees compensation. Griggs v.
Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962). However, several of the early state constitutions contained both the Magna Charta formula and specific eminent domain clauses,
suggesting the former were not thought to cover the latter. Compare the Delaware and
New Hampshire citations in notes 131 and 133, supra.
135.
VT. CONST., Ch. I, art. 11 (1777), found in 6 F. THORPE, FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 3740 (1909); VT. CONST., Ch. I, art. 11 (1786), found in 6 id. at 3752.
136. The 1780 Massachusetts constitution is most readily available in 3 F. THORPE.
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 1891 (1909). It also is in JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION FOR FRAMING A CONSTITUTION
CHUSETTS BAY 225 (1832).

137.

OF GOVERNMENT FOR THE STATE OF MASSA-

THE POPULAR SOURCES OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY 176-365 (0.

Handlin & M.

Handlin eds. 1966). All the towns of Essex County joined in a lengthy, learned.
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drafting committee reported the 1780 constitution to the convention,
it contained Article X-minus the last sentence. That sentence was
added by amendment from the floor and the amended article approved by the convention.' 38 Who offered the amendment, what arguments he made, or whom he represented, the convention journal does
not say. If the language "whenever the public exigencies require" is
more than merely descriptive, or to the extent it betrays its author's
state of mind, it shows a distrust of the legislative process that was no
part of Lockeian theory. John Locke, of course, was responsible for
the principle of legislative consent contained in the third sentence. He
reposed great confidence in the legislature, and many American rebels,
whom we take to be good enough libertarians, were content with that.
But out there somewhere in the hustings, in Lenox or Plymouth or
Beverly or Lexington or Pittsfield, 3 9 people sent a delegate who did
not trust even representative government all that much. He wanted,
first, to see the people's liberties perpetuated in a written bill of rights,
and then he did not have enough faith in his legislative representatives
to give them their head completely with his property.
A somewhat similar situation likely led to the adoption of the
United States' fifth amendment with its eminent domain clause. Everyone knows, of course, that the original Constitution contained no bill
of rights. The subject did come up. On 12 September 1787, five days
before adjournment, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts moved, and
George Mason of Virginia seconded, that a committee be appointed
to draft a bill of rights, but the motion lost unanimously. 140 Three
days later Mason objected to the Constitution because it had no bill of
rights.' 4 '
passionate demand for a bill of rights, which was probably penned by,'the very

conservative Theophilus Parsons.
138.
139.

JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 136, at 38, 194.
The choice of these towns is not wholly fanciful. When the convention met

in 1779 to draft what became the 1780 constitution, Pittsfield directed her delegate

to work for the language of the third sentence, though there is no evidence he was
instructed on the last sentence. THE POPULAR SOURCES OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY, supra

note 137, at 411. The other towns were ones that, in rejecting the 1778 constitution,

complained that it lacked a bill of rights. See note 137, supra.
140. 2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 582 (1911); J. MADISON,
NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 630 (A. Koch ed. 1969). Some
editions of Madison, and apparently a direct transcript of his notes, say the vote was

5-5, with Massachusetts absent. But Madison's handwritten notes agree with the
official journal that the motion "passed in the negative" 0-10.
141. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 140, at 637. In the end, Gerry and Mason, with
Edmund Randolph of Virginia, were the delegates who refused to sign the Constitu-
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That the Constitution would have failed ratification without an
understanding that a bill of rights would be submitted may be putting
the matter a bit strongly, but there were serious demands for one.
Many amendments were proposed in the ratifying conventions of
Maryland,

42

New York 143 and Pennsylvania.14 4 However, while there

was a popular groundswell for a bill of rights, we must frankly conclude that there is no evidence that eminent domain limitations were

given much attention. Moreover, there seems no indication that the
Revolutionary experience itself had created any particular alarm

about the expropriation power. Examination of the Declaration of
Independence and of ten other important Revolutionary documents
revealed that, while the British were scoundrels in a thousand ways,
they never abused eminent domain. 145 They surely would have been
accused of it if they had. Add to this the fact, which we well know,
tion, affording the only occasion in history that Massachusetts and Virginia ever
agreed on any political question. One suspects this strange fellowship was somehow
connected with the desire for a bill of rights, but it is not clear whether the desire
was a cause or effect of opposition to the Constitution.
142. In Maryland's ratifying convention, William Paca, who had signed the Constitution as a member of the federal convention, urged a number of amendments
guaranteeing personal liberties and limiting federal powers. A committee, at one
point, had worked up twenty-eight of them, none of which had to do with eminent
domain. However, the committee reported no amendments, and the Maryland convention ratified without adding any. 2 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 547-56 (1836).

143. New York went a little further. At one point opponents of the Constitution
as it stood, led by John Lansing, pushed through ratification "on condition" that a bill
of rights and some other amendments would be added. Then the convention substantially changed its mind and changed the quoted words to "in confidence". The
ratified version was preceded by a long series of recitals, mostly a bill of rights, that
the convention declared it understood were "consistent" with the Constitution. Finally,
the convention, over the signature of its president, George Clinton, circulated a letter
asking the governors of other states to work for amendments. I id. at 327-31, 411-14.
In none of this activity is there a record of any specific mention of an eminent domain
clause.
144. In Pennsylvania, after the state convention had ratified the Constitution. a
group of "gentlemen" met in Philadelphia and drafted some amendments they asked
the Philadelphia legislature to propose to Congress. 2 id. at 542 542-46. Again, their
draft contained no eminent domain clause.
145.

The ten other documents are found in the two volumes of PAPERS OF THOMAS

JEFFERSON (J. Boyd ed. 1950). Following are the documents, in each case the volume
number being given in Roman and the page in Arabic: Jefferson's draft of a "Declaration of Rights" for the August 1774 Virginia convention (1, 119-35); Resolutions and
Association of the 1774 Virginia convention (I, 149-54); Articles of Association
forming the Continental Congress (I, 149-54); Declaration of the Causes and Necessity for Taking Up Arms, adopted by Continental Congress 6 July 1775 (1, 213-18);
Jefferson's composition draft of the preceding (1, 193-98); Jefferson's fair copy of the
preceding (1, 199-203); John Dickinson's composition draft of the preceding If, 204-12):
Jefferson's three drafts of the Virginia constitution of 1776 (1, 337-83). Incidentally,
Jefferson's three drafts all contained a bill of rights but no eminent domain clause.
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that eminent domain had been hardly written on, and one wonders
how it got into our constitutions at all. Yet, on 8 June 1789 James
Madison presented his draft of twelve proposed amendments to the
first session of Congress. His seventh, which became the fifth in the
ratification process, contained double jeopardy, compulsory testimony,
and' due process clauses, followed by this eminent domain clause: "No
person shall be... obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be
necessary for public use, without a just compensation. ' 14 6 The suggestion of a public-use limitation is stronger than with the present language, but is it anywhere near conclusive? In any event, Madison's
original draft was amended, which, if it signifies anything, may imply
his language was too strong.
Here is a birdseye view of what seems to have happened with the
public-use or public-purpose doctrine. The civil law writers Grotius,
Pufendorf, and Bynkershoek, using varying semantic formulas, developed the notion that the exercise of eminent domain power should be
restricted to somewhat more necessitous situations than should other
governmental powers. American constitutional draftsmen, likely from
familiarity with the civil law writers, assumed a similar notion, which
they referred to obliquely but did not state explicitly. Considering especially that mill acts already existed in some colonies, it is doubtful
that the draftsmen thought condemnation could be only for the literal
use of the public. However, this was the meaning purportedly given in
some nineteenth century decisions, though no such general rule ever
really existed. Of recent years, while public-use language is still employed and may occasionally prevent a taking here and there, the
courts are realistically following a public-purpose test.
Whether the test is stated as public-use or public-purpose, there is
one thing about which American courts have always said they were
adamant. Eminent domain cannot be used to transfer property from
one private person to another.' 47 That would violate the most fundamental Lockeian principle that governments were instituted to protect
every man's property against his neighbor's depredations. But even
this principle has proven flexible, for mill acts are generally valid, and
some states confer private eminent domain power upon a landlocked
owner who needs a road. Of course the opponents of urban renewal
146.
147.

Annals of Congress, Ist Congress, Ist Session, Cols. 433-36.
See, e.g., Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 28 F. Cas. 1012 (No. 16,857), (D. Pa.

1795); Coster v. Tide Water Co., 18 NJ.Eq. 54 (1866).
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argued that it was bad because it authorized A's land to be condemned for sale to B. Berman v. Parker 48 and cases like it finesse the
argument, and the doctrine, by shifting the public purpose from use of
land to improving cities and removing slums. At this point the question Senator Tracy asked in Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R.
becomes very hard. Where can the eminent domain power be limited?
Perhaps we should rephrase the question by asking: where should
the power be limited? Bynkershoek seemed to agree with Pufendorf
that, for instance, land should not be taken for a park, though the
government might have unquestioned power to tax for and operate
the park. If there is a justification for so limiting the power to take
land, it must lie in some special evil that is associated with taking specific property interests but is not associated with other government
acts.
What is so evil about expropriating specific property that is not evil
about a general tax levy? One difference we have already seen: the
specific taking makes the loser bear an unfairly large share of the cost
of government. But we have also seen the law's response to this, which
is the compensation requirement. What further evil lies in the specific
taking that compensation will not cure? It would have to be some preferred status for the integrity of specific property in specific land or
things. In other words, it would be a less serious act, an act that could
be justified by lesser public need, for government, for example, to regulate proprietary uses or to levy a general tax, than to exact a specific
interest. Certainly our private law of property has running through it
a strong notion that a man is entitled to integrity of property. One
cannot be forced to accept a substitute, even if he and everyone else
agree it is better than what he has. Eminent domain, in essence, compels a substitution. On the other hand, there is, if anything, a stronger
notion that his neighbor cannot take something for nothing. Taxation,
in essence, forces this, or even viewed most benignly, forces a substitution of assets for government's protection and services. Viewed either
way, taxation appears to violate the property principles at least as
much as does eminent domain.
Still, perhaps there is some lurking reason to feel specially uneasy
about exactions of specific property interests. Professor Sax articulates
this in a way when he suggests that specific takings, which spend their
148.
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force on a single owner, have a certain capacity to tyrannize. 149 He
made the suggestion as part of a theory in support of the compensation requirement, though its implications would, if anything, actually
support a public-use or public-purpose limitation. The thought would
be that the taking of property from a singled-out owner could be used
by crafty rulers to penalize that owner. Taxation would do the same
thing if it were individually selective. This illustrates that it is not only
the loss of property interests that does the harm, for that occurs with
the general tax levy, but the selectivity of the loss. However, for this
harm to occur, we must assume the owner suffers, or perceives he suffers, some kind of loss that compensation, which we must assume will
equal the objective value of the interest, does not assuage. In other
words, we must assume owners attach a unique, non-monetary satisfaction to the holding of specific property interests. It is only through
the non-compensable denial of this form of satisfaction that the disfavored citizen could be punished and tyrannized.
Do owners in fact attach this satisfaction to property that money
cannot quench? Presumably there are no statistics on this, but it seems
a reasonable answer would be, "sometimes yes, sometimes no." One
may think about it for himself and will probably conclude he would
be happy to be relieved of some items and not of others. All this
would seem to make eminent domain a fairly unpredictable, and so,
dull, tool for evil rulers to use to tyrannize selected subjects. No evidence has been found suggesting it has been so used. And, at any rate,
if it were attempted, it would, in our legal system, be an arbitrary act
that could be enjoined as a denial of due process. Any potential for
harm is more theoretical than real.
The conclusion is that there is no sufficient reason to limit the exercise of eminent domain any more than of other powers of government.
All exercises, including regulations and taxations, are intrusions upon
individual liberty, but they are necessary to prevent greater human,
losses in an interdependent society. Eminent domain poses no special
threat to the individual that would require special limitations on the
occasions of its exercise. It is not black magic, but merely one of the
powers of government, to be used along with the other powers as long
as some ordinary purpose of government is served.
None of this, however, speaks to the special problem of eminent
149.

See note 115 and accompanying text, supra.
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domain's being used to transfer A's property to B. Take that simple
case: government pays for and condemns A's land and immediately
gives it to B. No one will seriously contend that the transfer was not
from A to B, just because the land paused momentarily in the government. If the act was done because B was the governor's brother or
political supporter or some such, it is void as offending due process
and probably equal protection. It also fails to meet the test of public
purpose set out above. Suppose, however, it is the declared and accepted public purpose of the state to assist needy persons, among
whom B is the neediest. At this point the Lockeian political theorist
will be greatly upset: governments were instituted to protect and preserve property rights that members of society brought into or acquired
within society. If, in the name of serving society and protecting us all
from the depredations of ragged beggars, government directly takes
our land and gives it to them, surely the process has come round full
circle and has defeated itself. Given his predilections, the Lockeian is
right.
Suppose, however, one accepts a more Rousseauist philosophy of
government. Certainly if he shares the collectivist ethic that we are all
trustees of property for the state, then the state may do as it wishes
with its land. Or even if he accepts Rousseau's idea that it is the function of the state to see that all have enough and none have too much,
the transfer from A to B is a proper act, at least if A has too much as
well as B's having too little. In other words, even if we assiduously
apply the public purpose test, it does not tell us whether A's land can
go to B unless we have determined our governmental purposes. Thus,
when a court says A's land cannot go to B because there is no public
purpose, it is assuming a particular role of government without saying
so.

The fact is that our society has never been wholly Lockeian or
wholly Rousseauist. Maybe it is truer to say people often do what is
expedient and do not always check with their theoreticians before they
act. The mill acts, which we have seen existed in colonial times, allowed the transfer of water and flowage easements from A to B. Railroads, turnpikes, and various public utilities have, nearly since the
beginning of the Union, enjoyed the power to condemn A's land unto
themselves. Certainly the public benefitted by being able to use the
facilities (for a price), but that does not change whose land went to
whom. Urban renewal, whether it occurred in the 1950's, as in
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Berman v. Parker,150 or a hundred years ago, as in Dingley v. City of
Boston, 15 1 allows A's land to be condemned for B when this would
serve some purpose legislatively designated and judicially accepted as
public.
.If there is a doctrine that property cannot be condemned from one
person to be transfered to another, it has some large exceptions. Any
such doctrine would flow from a public-purpose limitation only if, in a
pure Lockeian theory, it were always against public policy to allow
such transfers. What the courts mean to say, and what might be defensible statistically, is that such transfers tend more than transfers to the
government to be for non-public purposes and so more or less tend to
be suspect. We must still inquire in each case what are the public purposes, according to the theory already worked out.
IV.

THE PROPERTY CONCEPT

If there is one categorical thing we can say about eminent domain,
it is that it always concerns property. This statement rests on nothing
more nor less than a convention, almost a definition, just as the
meaning of all language must rest on convention or communication is
impossible. Of course one might speak of the condemnation of life,
liberty, or the pursuit of happiness, but one does not because Grotius,
Pufendorf, Bynkershoek, Vattel, Locke, the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the fifth amendment, Chancellor Kent, and Nichols on
Eminent Domain do not.
We now can add to a definition of eminent domain that was begun
at an earlier point in this article: it is a power of government by which
property of private persons may be transferred to the government, or
to an alter ego such as a public utility, over the transferor's immediate, personal protest. It is encouraging to progress to this point, but
once again it is all too evident we have bitten into another large question. What is "property"? Two lines of inquiry provide a foundation
for answering this question: First, the historical development of the
property concept in eminent domain, and second, the correct theoretical model of that concept.
Down to the time when the United States and early state constitu150.
151.

348 U.S. 26(1954).
100 Mass. 544 (1868).
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tions were adopted, the few writings there were on eminent domain
spoke of the taking of "property."'152 Never, in these sources, nor, so
far as has been found, in any source, was there any attempt to describe or define what was meant by "property." That basically was the
situation when the fifth amendment, like the other early constitutions,
referred to the taking of "property." Superficially we have a definitional problem, but so are questions about what is "God," "law," and
"justice"-superficially. In the pre-Revolutionary era land had been
taken by being physically invaded by public projects like roads,
bridges, and drainage works. These kinds of appropriations do not
force difficult decisions on the taking of property. The difficult decisions are forced by cases that involve no physical touching of the alleged condemnee's land.
To identify the problem more narrowly, it arises out of the ambiguous character of the word "property." Hohfeld observed this, the
word's capacity for denoting the physical thing or, alternatively, legal
interests pertaining to the thing. 153 In the words of Morris R. Cohen,
"Anyone who frees himself from the crudest materialism readily recognizes that as a legal term property denotes not material things but
certain rights."' 154 Property, like beauty, exists in the eye of the beholder-provided he is legally educated. But ask your local real estate
man what he thinks "property" is or-let us quit pretending-listen
sometime to lawyers carrying on a casual conversation about "that
property down on the corner."
Suppose that some governmental entity, such as the Village of
Newburgh, New York, takes its water supply out of a stream that
152. H. GROTIus, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS 807 (F. Kelsey transl. 1925); S. PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM 1285 (C.H. & W.A. Oldfather transl. 1934); C.
VAN BYNKERSHOEK, QUESTIONUM JURIS PUBLICi 218-23 (T. Frank transl. 1930); E. DE
VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 96 (C. Fenwick transl. 1916). This was also true of
Locke and Blackstone when they wrote that an owner might be divested of his
"property" only by his own consent or the consent of his legislative representatives.
J. LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING CIVIL GOVERNMENT, Ch. XI, at 378-80 (P. Laslett
ed. 1960); 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *138-39. Likewise, colonial highway acts,

such as Massachusetts', generally required compensation for one's "Proprietary or
Improved Grounds" or some equivalent words. Mass. L. 1693, Ch. 10, contained in
ACTS AND LAWS OF HIS MAJESTY'S PROVINCE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS-BAY 47-49 (B.
Green printer 1726). The constitutions adopted during the Revolution, when they
had eminent domain clauses, spoke of the taking or appropriation of "property," as
did the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights of 1780. MASS. CONST., Declaration of
Rights, art. X (1780), found in 3 F. THORPE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 1891

(1909).
153.
154.
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flows through the plaintiff's land. His water level is appreciably lowered, so that he now fails to receive enough water for his domestic and
commercial uses. Has he lost "property" in the form of riparian
fights? Not if we say his protected "property" is the land, for there has
beepn no physical invasion. Chancellor Kent did allow compensation in
1816 in Gardner v. Trustees of Village of Newburgh, recognizing a
non-physical concept of property. 15 5 A few years later New Hampshire reached a consistent result in a case in which the holder of a
bridge franchise was held to have a compensable interest in the franchise.

15 6

Quite to the contrary was the Massachusetts decision in 1823 in
Callenderv. Marsh, 5 7 the best known and most influential of the early
cases. This was the original change-of-grade case, in which the cutting
down of a street blocked an abutting owner's access onto it. Though
an abutter is now and was then supposed to have an easement of
access, the court refused compensation, one reason being that no land
had been touched. Why should "property" be conceived of in its
physical sense? The famous Chief Justice Gibson of Pennsylvania
explained in another influential decision, Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Coons, that this was so because "Words which do not of
themselves denote that they are used in a technical sense, are to have
their plain, popular, obvious, and natural meaning."'' 58 Gibson, in
other words, preferred the real estate man's meaning of "property."
Additionally, the courts advanced the practical reason that it would be
a severe burden if condemnors had to pay for "consequential"
damage; that is, harm to intangible interests. 159
The popular notion became, "no taking without a touching." It
would be something of an oversimplification unreservedly to label the
physical concept of property the "older" view. For one thing, it has
155.

2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. 1816). The "property" question was not, however,

the most hotly contested issue. Chancellor Kent was faced with a situation in which
New York, at the time the injury occurred, had no eminent domain clause in its
constitution. He had to, and did, work out a theory of compensation on natural law
grounds.
156.

Proprietors of Piscataqua Bridge v. New-Hampshire Bridge, 7 N.H. 35 (1834).

The plaintiff held a franchise from the state to maintain a bridge on a certain stretch
of river. Later, when the state granted another franchise to the defendant within the
same stretch, this was held a taking of the plaintiff's franchise.
157.
158.

18 Mass. (I Pick.) 418 (1823).
6Watts&S. 101, 114 (Pa. 1843).

159. Commissioners of Homochitto River v. Withers, 29 Miss. (7 Cush.) 21
(1855); O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. (6 Harris) 187 (1851).
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had its opponents, not only Chancellor Kent, but others, mostly legal
writers, for over a hundred years. 160 At the other end of the equation,
16 1
the physical concept still exerts a heavy influence in some opinions.
Nevertheless, the trend has been away from a touching requirement,
with increasing acceptance of takings without any physical invasion.
Some examples of this trend follow.
Where access is not limited or denied in the original opening of the
way, an abutting owner is judically recognized to have an easement of
reasonable access upon a public street or road and thence to the general system of public ways. If some entity having eminent domain
power blocks or denies this reasonable access, there should in theory
be a taking, wholly or partially, of this easement. Callender v. Marsh,
of course, denied compensation where the blockage was by a change
of street grade. Except for a few jurisdictions, Callender's influence
was so great that compensation is still denied on those facts unless a
constitutional clause allows compensation for a "damaging" or unless
a statute allows it. However, over half the states have such clauses or
statutes. In fact patterns other than change of grade, which have
tended to develop after the middle of the nineteenth century, the
courts have been influenced little by Callender's hard and fast rule.
We have in mind phenomena such as street closures, declarations of
no access or of limited access, blockage of the abutting street at some
point before the next intersecting street, and the closure of the original
abutting street accompanied by the opening of a new one that gives
poorer access. Of recent years freeways and limited-access highways,
which cut across established road networks, have produced many of
these fact patterns. Certainly there has been a great deal of judicial
inconsistency in these situations, with some strange twists and turns of
doctrine. Still and all, the long-range tendency has been toward giving
compensation on account of unreasonable loss of access.
Another kind of property right that may be lost or diminished
without a trespassory invasion is included under the label "riparian
rights." A riparian owner is recognized to have property rights in the
160.
1 J. LEWIS, EMINENT DOMAIN 52, 55 (3d ed. 1909); T. SEDGWICK. STATUTORY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 524 (1857).

161. See, e.g., Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962) (no property
taken by noise, vibration and smoke from airplane flights); Nunnally v. United
States, 239 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1956) (no property taken by noise and shock from
cannon); Randall v. City of Milwaukee, 212 Wis. 374, 249 N.W. 73 (1933) (no compensation for "consequential" harm from partial blocking of street access).
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adjacent water, chiefly continuation of the body of water substantially
in its natural state, limited uses of it, and access to it. These rights
may more or less vary locally, depending upon the existence of doctrines such as an appropriation system for allotting use of water.
Whatever his rights are under local law, the owner may suffer loss or
diminution of them due to the acts of a body having eminent domain
power. Some of the common acts are blockage of access, water pollution, changes of flow or level, and restrictions of his use of the surface.
In these fact patterns many decisions do recognize that a taking may
occur. However, the status of the taking theory is complicated by
what might be called the intrusion of other theories. In some cases,
particularly those involving water pollution or restrictions on surface
use, courts prefer to analyze the problem by use of nuisance theory or
by considering the acts of the public body as an exercise of police
power. A larger intrusion is the navigation-servitude doctrine, under
which private riparian rights are subservient to the power of governmerit, usually the federal government, to regulate navigation. So, for
instance, a governmental blocking of access or surface use that otherwise would be a wrong and a taking will not be such if the court finds
the government acted under its power to regulate navigation. The
upshot of all this is that, while riparian rights are recognized as property subject to being expropriated, recognition of the right is masked
in many cases by the application of several theories.
One who owns a parcel of land will or may have certain property
rights that extend to lands the general possession of which is in others.
He may have the benefit of an appurtenant easement; a restrictive
covenant; or rights of light, air and view; and will be entitled to lateral
support from his neighbor. If these rights be viewed as species of
property, they should be capable of being taken by'an eminent domain act. In the nature of things, this act will always occur outside the
benefitted lands, as where some government project on the servient or
burdened land blocks the easement or is contrary to the restriction of
the covenant. Since the Supreme Court decision in United States v.
Welch, 162 the courts have not hesitated to grant compensation for
easements. With restrictive covenants many courts, though probably
now a minority, have refused compensation, finding no "property"
affected and fearing to open the floodgates to claims they feel would
162.

217 U.s. 333 (1910).
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be nebulous and burdensome. There is a small amount of authority on
the taking of lateral support that indicates it normally will be recognized as compensable property. 163 Regarding loss of light, air, and
view, the decisions are so few that it is hard to say what has been the
course of development.
There is a final kind of interest that only a handful of courts have
recognized as condemnable property, and then often hazily. An owner
of land has a right to be free of certain kinds of annoying activity
from occupiers of other land. This is the law of nuisance, which lies at
the intersection of our categories of tort and property law. If a governmental agency conducts such an activity nearby, of course the injured
owner may not enjoin the activity, but might he not claim the government had extinguished and taken his landowner's property right to be
free from such nuisances? The main cause of claims today is the noise,
dust, and fumes from jet aircraft landing and taking off from publicly
owned airports. A half-dozen or so jurisdictions have allowed compensation in cases involving airports, garbage dumps, and disposal
plants. Many more decisions, of which the Supreme Court's Richards
v. Washington Terminal Company1 64 is the leading example, will
allow compensation if the harm is especially serious and peculiar to
this plaintiff. Of course, when compensation is allowed in any of these
cases, it implies a property interest was affected, though the courts
typically do not openly identify or describe the interest. The area is an
eminent domain frontier where the courts still need to formulate an
adequate framework of analysis.
We see, then, that American courts were, in effect, originally told to
award the expropriation of "property" without being told what it was.
Most early nineteenth century courts began by assuming the word
could be applied in its popular physical sense. That concept proved
inadequate and unacceptable in many situations that began to arise
where an owner had obviously lost a valuable right, yet there had
been no touching of his land. Increasingly, therefore, courts have been
willing to say "property" has been taken without a physical invasion.
While the trend is in that direction, the change is by no means com163. In some cases the loss of lateral support was caused by excavation for a
change of street grade. If the court, under the influence of Callender v. Marsh,
refuses compensation for loss of access from this cause, it may also refuse compensation for the loss of support. See note 157 and accompanying text, supra.
164. 233 U.S. 546(1914).
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plete. For one thing, the shadows of the nineteenth century linger. For
another, courts often show their fear to lift the lid off a Pandora's box
of eminent domain claims.
Let us now inquire into the theoretical model for "property" as the
concept ought to be used in eminent domain. The starting point is our
earlier discussion of the act of taking. 165 We there said that a taking
involves the transfer of property from an owner to the condemnor.
The transfer, indeed, is one that might have been, and of course frequently is, made as the result of a negotiated bargain. "Eminent domain" is a power of the sovereign to require, in theory to give legislative consent for, the transfer-and that is all it is, a power. Eminent
domain does not make the transfer; it is not the transfer. It only requires that the transfer be made. The transfer itself is no different
from a freely negotiated one between the owner and the government.
What sorts of things might an owner transfer? The answer reads
like the introductory chapter of a treatise on property law, where we
learn about "interests in land": fees simple, future estates, leaseholds,
easements, riparian rights, restrictive covenants, et cetera. These are
what the owner owns, and there is a way he can create or transfer
each one of them.1 66 Eminent domain transfers are no different; they are
of the same kinds of interests as the owner might grant, convey, assign,
release, sell, or lease to anyone. To anyone: what this says is that the
interests transferred to the sovereign are the same interests as those
recognized in the law of property among private persons.
67
Putting this together with something developed at an earlier stage,
no act of eminent domain occurs unless there is a transfer to the
government and unless the transfer is of an interest such as an owner
might transfer to a private person. And, of course we add, parenthetically, that the transfer has occurred over the owner's immediate,
personal protest. Will this work in practice? This question, too, was
discussed at an earlier point, where the suggested test was found to
produce rational results even in difficult fact patterns.168 Perhaps the
most difficult case to analyze is the loss of street access caused by, say,
a whole or partial drivewa closure. What property interest such as
165.
166.

See part I, supra.
A possible exception, of no consequence here, is that the attempted aliena-

tion of a right of entry, arguably also of a possibility of reverter, might terminate it.
167.
168.

See notes 58-59 and accompanying text, supra.
Id.
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the owner might transfer to a private person has he transferred to the
city? The interest involved is an elusive one, for it is the easement of
access the owner had onto the city's own street. It was not precisely
an easement against another private person, though it was the kind
of right one might hold against a private person. The city's act of
blocking access wholly or partially extinguished the easement or, in
other words, worked a whole or partial release of it to the city.
The definition of "property" also fits some larger purposes that
eminent domain should serve-that its very existence seems to imply.
Underneath the idea that a citizen should be compensated at all by his
government, there runs the current that, insofar as possible, the state
should be no better off with him than if the state had been another
private person. The necessities of maintaining a government require
that it have the power to extract property, including tax money, from
its subjects. The Lockeian principle of just share requires that, in specific extractions, such as eminent domain brings, citizens be evened up
among themselves with compensation. 16 9 In harmony with this principle, if not actually symmetrical, is the principle suggested, that government should stand on the same footing as a private person as respects
the kinds of property interests that are subjects of eminent domain.
For the condemnee this does obvious justice by insuring him payment
for whatever a private person would pay for. It also does justice to the
condemnor by insuring that compensation will not be due for unknown and exotic interests. We might mention also that the invariable
measure of the amount of compensation, market value, can work only
when the interest being valued is one recognized on the private
market.
The conclusion is that "property" in eminent domain means every
species of interest in land and things of a kind that an owner might
transfer to another private person. With this our exploration of the
elements of eminent domain is finished.
A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
This short final section will not be a summary or conclusion in the
usual sense. It will instead attempt to lift out the basic elements of
eminent domain that have been developed in theory and to arrange
169.
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them into an order that will allow them to be applied. The intended
product is a framework of analysis that can be used to solve taking
problems, both those where there is and those where there is not a
touching of the would-be condemnee's land.
We have three separate questions we must answer before we can
determine whether a claimant is entitled to eminent domain compensation. First, we must determine if a property interest of the kind that
could pass between private owners is involved or has been affected. As
a practical matter, this question of "property" is often so bound in
with the "taking" question that the two are difficult to think of separately. But it aids analysis to do so, even if this forces a certain
amount of artificial conceptualizing. We must be able to identify a
known species of private property interest or, whatever has happened
and regardless of whether causes of action may exist on other theories,
there will be no exercise of eminent domain.
Assuming "property" is involved, the second question is whether
that interest has been "taken." The critical inquiry in this step is
whether the property interest has been transferred from an owner to
the condemning entity. This can be very difficult. Suppose a city
should impose building height limits as part of a zoning scheme.
Normally this will not constitute a taking because, admitting arguendo
that there has been a kind of redistribution of property interests similar to covenantal height restrictions among private owners in the zone,
there has been no transfer to the city. But if we may imagine a fantastic situation in which the city owned a great deal of land in the
zone and passed the ordinance for the benefit of that land, then a
taking may arguably have occurred. Or suppose the city passes a
traffic safety ordinance prohibiting abutters on a certain street from
driving onto it. A taking has occurred, because the city has in effect
compelled a release by the owners of the access easement they formerly had against the city's street. Certainly the ordinance also is a
police-power regulation, but one should not fall into the trap of
thinking it cannot therefore be a taking; it is both. A great deal of precise thinking is needed to determine if a transfer to the state has occurred. It must then be asked whether this transfer was without the
immediate, personal consent of the owner, but the answer is generally
apparent.
If "property" has been "taken," one may say there has been an attempted exercise of the eminent domain power. The final question is
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whether the governmental entity, assuming it is an agency generally
vested with eminent domain power, may invoke the power in this instance. At stake is whether the government's acts in taking the property interest are in furtherance of some object that is within the power
of that particular governmental body. In the (increasingly rare) cases
in which this question is answered in the negative, the attempted
taking should of course be judicially enjoined. If the question is answered affirmatively, compensation will be due.
This framework of analysis may be deceptively simple. The steps
may seem too mechanical. But behind each step is a theory that has its
foundation in our historical conception of a people and their government. Most courts would do well to follow the framework if they
never got beyond the mechanics of it. They would do better if they
were led to look beyond the framework to its foundations.
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